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NON-ARCHIMEDEAN ANALYSIS, T -FUNCTIONS,
AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
VLADIMIR ANASHIN
Abstract. These are lecture notes of a 20-hour course at the Interna-
tional Summer School Mathematical Methods and Technologies in Com-
puter Security at Lomonosov Moscow State University, July 9–23, 2006.
Loosely speaking, a T -function is a map of n-bit words into n-bit
words such that each i-th bit of image depends only on low-order bits
0, . . . , i of the pre-image. For example, all arithmetic operations (addi-
tion, multiplication) are T -functions, all bitwise logical operations (XOR,
AND, etc.) are T -functions. Any composition of T -functions is a T -
function as well. Thus T -functions are natural computer word-oriented
functions.
It turns out that T -functions are continuous (and often differen-
tiable!) functions with respect to the so-called 2-adic distance. This
observation gives a powerful tool to apply 2-adic analysis to construct
wide classes of T -functions with provable cryptographic properties (long
period, balance, uniform distribution, high linear complexity, etc.); these
functions currently are being used in new generation of fast stream ci-
phers. We consider these ciphers as specific automata that could be as-
sociated to dynamical systems on the space of 2-adic integers. From this
view the lectures could be considered as a course in cryptographic ap-
plications of the non-Archimedean dynamics; the latter has recently at-
tracted significant attention in connection with applications to physics,
biology and cognitive sciences.
During the course listeners study non-Archimedean machinery and
its applications to stream cipher design.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Goals. Imagine we are a team of cryptographers, and we are going to
design a software-oriented cipher. That is, we are going to combine basic
microchip instructions to make a very specific transformation of machine
words. On the one hand, this transformation must be fast; that is, the
corresponding computer program must achieve high performance. On the
other hand, this transformation must be secure: Having both an output
(that is, encrypted text) and the program, it must be infeasible to obtain
illegally the corresponding input (i.e., plain text).
At this point, we should understand the following issues:
• What are these basic instructions? What are reasonable composi-
tions of these instructions?
• Could we give an evidence that certain transformation of this kind
is secure?
Actually, a goal of the course is to clarify these issues. Moreover, in order
to make our considerations not too general, and to conclude with some
practical applications, we restrict ourselves with a certain specific kind of
ciphers, the so-called stream ciphers.
1.2. What are stream ciphers? In contemporary digital computers in-
formation is represented in a binary form, as a sequence of zeros and ones.
So a plaintext is a sequence α0, α1, α2, . . ., where αj ∈ B = {0, 1}. Let
Γ = γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . be another sequence of zeros and ones, which is known
both to Alice and Bob, and which is known to no third party. The sequence
Γ is called a keystream. To encrypt a plaintext, Alice just XORes it with
the key:
α0, α1, α2, . . . , αi, . . . (plaintext)⊕
(bitwise addition modulo 2)
γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, . . . (keystream)
ζ0, ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζi, . . . (encrypted text)
To decrypt, Bob acts in the opposite order:
ζ0, ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζi, . . . (encrypted text)⊕
(bitwise addition modulo 2)
γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, . . . (keystream)
α0, α1, α2, . . . , αi, . . . (plaintext)
Loosely speaking, Shannon’s Theorem states that this encryption is secure
providing the keystream Γ is picked at random for each plaintext. In real
life settings we very rarely could fulfil conditions of Shannon’s Theorem, and
usually we use a pseudorandom keystream Γ rather than a random one. That
is, usually in real life ciphers Γ is produced by a certain algorithm, and Γ only
looks like random (e.g., passes certain statistical tests). A pseudorandom
generator, or a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is an algorithm
that takes a short random string (which is called a key, or a seed) and
stretches it into a much longer sequence, a keystream. Actually, within the
scope of the course we speak about stream cipher meaning the latter is
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Figure 1. Ordinary PRNG
a pseudorandom generator which is used for encryption according to the
protocol described above.
Not every PRNG is suitable for stream encryption. Stream ciphers are
cryptographically secure PRNG’s; that is, they must not only produce statis-
ticlly good sequences, but also they must withstand cryptoanalyst’s attacks.
2. Preliminaries
Now we will try to state some of the above mentioned notions more for-
mally. We start with our main notion, a PRNG.
2.1. Pseudorandom generators. Basically, a generator we consider dur-
ing the course is a finite automaton A = 〈N,M, f, F, u0〉 with a finite state
set N , state transition (or, state update) function f : N → N , finite output
alphabetM , output function F : N →M and an initial state (seed) u0 ∈ N .
Thus, this generator (see Figure 1) produces a sequence
S = {F (u0), F (f(u0)), F (f (2)(u0)), . . . , F (f (j)(u0)), . . .}
over the set M , where
f (j)(u0) = f(. . . f(︸ ︷︷ ︸
j times
u0) . . .) (j = 1, 2, . . .); f
(0)(u0) = u0.
Automata of the form A could be used either as pseudorandom generators
per se, or as components of more complicated pseudorandom generators, the
so called counter-dependent generators (see Figure 2); the latter produce
sequences {z0, z1, z2, . . .} over M according to the rule
z0 = F0(u0), u1 = f0(u0); . . . zi = Fi(ui), ui+1 = fi(ui); . . . (2.0.1)
That is, at the (i + 1)th step the automaton Ai = 〈N,M, fi, Fi, ui〉 is ap-
plied to the state ui ∈ N , producing a new state ui+1 = fi(ui) ∈ N , and
outputting a symbol zi = Fi(ui) ∈M .
Now to make our considerations more practical, we must impose certain
restrictions on these state update and output functions. As we want our
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Figure 2. Counter-dependent PRNG
generators to be implemented in software and to demonstrate good perfor-
mance, these functions can not be arbitrary, they must be finally written as
more or less short programs. That is, these functions must be represented as
(not too complicated) compositions of basic instructions of a contemporary
processor. Then, what are these basic instructions?
2.2. Basic instructions. A contemporary processor is word-oriented. That
is, it works with words of zeroes and ones of a certain fixed length n (usually
n = 8, 16, 32, 64). Each binary word z ∈ Bn of length n could be considered
as a base-2 expansion of a number z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} and vise versa:
z = ζ0 + ζ1 · 2 + ζ2 · 22 + · · · ←→ ζ0ζ1ζ2 . . . ∈ Bn
We also can identify the set {0, 1, . . . , 2n−1} with residues modulo 2n; that is
with the elements of the residue ring Z/2nZ modulo 2n. Actually, arithmetic
(numerical) instructions of a processor are just operations of the residue ring
Z/2nZ: An n-it word processor performing a single instruction of addition
(or multiplication) of two n-bit numbers just deletes more significant digits
of a sum (or of a product) of these numbers thus merely reducing the result
modulo 2n. Note that to calculate a sum of two integers (i.e., without reduc-
ing the result modulo 2n) a ‘standard’ processor uses not a single instruction
but a program tt consists of basic instructions!
Other sort of basic instructions of a processor are bitwise logical opera-
tions: XOR, OR, AND, NOT, which are clear from their definitions. It worth
notice only that the set Bn with respect to XOR could be considered also as
an n-dimensional vector space over a field Z/2Z = B.
The third type of instructions could be called a machine ones, since they
depend on a processor. But usually they include such standard instructions
as shifts (left and right) and circular rotations of an n-bit word.
Some more formal sample definitions: Let
z = δ0(z) + δ1(z) · 2 + δ2(z) · 22 + δ3(z) · 23 + · · ·
be a base-2 expansion for z ∈ N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.Then, according to the
respective definitions, we have
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• y XOR z = y⊕ z is a bitwise addition modulo 2: δj(y XOR z) ≡ δj(y)+
δj(z) (mod 2);
• y AND z is a bitwise multiplication modulo 2: δj(y AND z) ≡ δj(y)·δj(z)
(mod 2);
• ⌊z2⌋, the integral part of z2 , is a shift towards less significant bits;• 2 · z is a shift towards more significant bits;
• y AND z is masking of z with the mask y;
• z (mod 2k) = z AND(2k − 1) is a reduction of z modulo 2k
Let us make the first important observation:
Basic instructions of a processor, with the exception of rota-
tions, are well defined on the whole set of positive integers.
Now we look at the basic instructions from a bit another point.
2.3. T -functions. From a school textbook algorithm of addition of base-2
expansions of positive integers it immediately follows that each i-th bit of
the sum does not depend on higher order bits of summands, i.e., on j-th
bits with j > i. The same holds for products, bitwise logical operations, and
shifts towards higher order bits. This observation gives rise to the following
definition:
Definition 2.1 (T-function). An (m-variate) T -function is any mapping
F : (. . . , α↓2, α
↓
1, α
↓
0) 7→ (. . . ,Φ2(α↓0, α↓1, α↓2),Φ1(α↓0, α↓1),Φ0(α↓0))
where α↓i ∈ Bm is a Boolean columnar m-dimensional vector; B = {0, 1};
Φi : (B
m)(i+1) → Bn maps (i + 1) Boolean columnar m-dimensional vectors
α↓i , . . . , α
↓
0 to n-dimensional Boolean vector Φi(α
↓
0, . . . , α
↓
i ).
For instance, a univariate T -function F : Bn → Bn is a mapping of Bn
into itself such that
(. . . , χ2, χ1, χ0)
F7→ (. . . ;ψ2(χ0, χ1, χ2);ψ1(χ0, χ1);ψ0(χ0)),
where χj ∈ {0, 1}, and each ψj(χ0, . . . , χj) is a Boolean function in Boolean
variables χ0, . . . , χj .
Thus, we state that
Basic instructions of a processor, with the exception of rota-
tions and shifts towards low order bits, are T -functions.
Obviously, a composition of T -functions is a T -function; so while com-
bining basic instructions into a program, we very often can say that the
resulting mapping (that is, a program) is a T -function. So, it seems to be a
good idea to study the above mentioned automata under a restriction that
both their state update and output functions are T -functions, and try to
design a stream cipher on their base.
Few words about terminology: Despite the term ‘T -function’ was sug-
gested only in 2002 by A. Klimov and A. Shamir, see [15], these mappings
are well-known mathematical objects dating back to 1960th (however, un-
der other names: Compatible mappings in algebra, determined functions in
automata theory, triangle boolean mappings in the theory of Boolean func-
tions, functions that satisfy Lipschitz condition with constant 1 in p-adic
analysis; see e.g. [19], [25], [4]). Throughout the course we use the term
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‘T -function’ as the most accepted by cryptographic community; however,
we will be interested in those properties of T -functions that are explored in
other areas of mathematics. The mentioned p-adic analysis appears to be
the most important one.
2.4. Preparations to p-adic Calculus. We can calculate a sum of two
positive integers represented by their base-2 expansions with a ‘school text-
book’ algorithm. Note that the summands are represented as finite strings
of 0’s and 1’s (or, better to say, as infinite strings of 0’s and 1’s that con-
tain only finite number of 1’s). Let us look what happens if we apply this
algorithm to arbitrary infinite strings of 0’s and 1’s.
Consider an example:
. . . 1 1 1 1
+
. . . 0 0 0 1
. . . 0 0 0 0
Obviously, the string . . . 000 is merely 0, and the string . . . 001 is 1. But
then wemust conclude that . . . 111 = −1; that is, the infinite string . . . 111 is
a base-2 expansion of a negative integer −1. With this in mind, we continue
our investigations. Let’s try multiplication now:
. . . 0 1 0 1 0 1
×
. . . 0 0 0 0 1 1
. . . 0 1 0 1 0 1
+
. . . 1 0 1 0 1
. . . 1 1 1 1 1 1
As we know that . . . 0011 = 3, and, as we have agreed, . . . 111 = −1, then
we are forced to conclude that . . . 01010101 = −13 . This sounds somewhat
odd for us, but not so for a computer! These calculations could be made
with an ordinary Windows built-in calculator, up to the best precision it
admits, 64 bits.1
Now denote Z2 the set of all infinite binary strings. We could define
addition and multiplication on Z2 with the said school-textbook algorithms,
thus turning Z2 into a ring. Obviously, any T -function is well defined on
Z2. Summing it up, we conclude that
1Don’t forget to switch the calculator into scientific mode and choose bin.
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Basic processor instructions, with the only exception of ro-
tations, as well as T -functions, are well defined functions on
the set Z2 of all infinite binary sequences; these functions are
evaluated in Z2.
As a matter of fact, these functions turn out to be continuous in some
well-defined sense. Moreover, very often they are differentiable functions,
and we can use a special sort of Calculus to study their properties that
are crucial for cryptography with the techniques similar to that of classical
Calculus. That is what we are going to do within the course.
What we are thinking about when saying ‘Calculus’? Well, of derivations,
for instance. And what notion do we use in the definition of a derivative?
Evidently, a notion of limit. But saying that ‘a is a limit of the sequence
{ai}∞i=0 of numbers as i goes to infinity’ we just mean that these ai are
approximations of a, and we can achieve an arbitrarily good precision of
these approximations by taking sufficiently large i.
Now we are going to understand what does this ‘precision’ means, or,
better to say, what a computer thinks of what ‘precision’ means. A com-
puter can not work with arbitrarily long binary words. Actually, its basic
instructions work with words of certain length, a bitlength. Usual values of
bitlengths of contemporary processors are 8,16,32, 64.
Now take some binary string, e.g., a string 1 . . . 111︸ ︷︷ ︸
64 times
; that is, a number
264−1 = 18446744073709551615. A 8-bit processor can work only with 8-bit
string, so it can store only 8 less significant bits of this string; that is, the
number 28 − 1 = 255. A 16-bit processor stores 16 bit, that is, the number
216−1 = 65535; a 32-bit processor stores this string as 232−1 = 4294967295,
etc. It is reasonable to say that 255 is an approximation with 8-bit precision
of the number 264− 1, 65535 is an approximation with 16-bit precision, etc.
Following this logic, we finally conclude that the sequence
255, 65535, 4294967295, . . . , 22
n − 1, . . .
tends to −1 = . . . 111 as k goes to infinity, and the same does the sequence
2n−1. That is,
2
lim
n→∞
(2n−1) = −1, where
2
lim is something that behaves like
an ordinary limit, but with respect to the ‘n-bit precision’. Further, in case
we want this
2
lim behave similarly to an ordinary limit, we must conclude
that
2
lim
n→∞
2n = 0, which is extremely odd!2
To discover the underlying reality, we now must understand on what
notion is the notion of limit based. Recalling the classical definition, we see
that the notion of limit is stated in terms of ‘how close the two numbers
are’. That is, the notion of limit is based on the notion of distance!
The above examples demonstrate that for human beings and for comput-
ers, ‘distance’ means quite different things, or, better to say, is measured in
different ways. For us, human beings, a number 232 = 4294967296 lies at a
bigger distance from 0 than the number 28 = 256; on the contrary, 232 is
2Not too odd, however. Intuitively, the sequence . . . 0001, . . . 0010, . . . 0100, . . ., which
is the sequence of base-2 expansions of 1, 2, 4, 8, . . ., tends to . . . 0000 = 0!
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closer to 0 than 28, for a computer. What a peculiar distance a computer
uses?
3. The notion of p-adic integer
3.1. The notion of distance. Actually, when we measure a distance be-
tween two points, we associate a non-negative real number to the pair of
points. Obviously, this number is 0 if and only if these points coincide, and
the distance measured from the first point to the second one is equal to the
distance measured in the opposite direction, from the second point towards
the first. The distance obeys the ‘law of a triangle’; that is, the distance
from the first point A to the second point B is not greater than the sum
of two distances, from the first point A to an arbitrary third point C, and
from this third point C to the point B. These observations are summarized
in the following definition3:
Definition 3.1 (Metric). Let M be a non-empty set, and let d : M ×M →
R≥0 be a function valuated in non-negative real numbers. The function d
is called a metric (and M is called a metric space) whenever d obeys the
following laws:
(1) For every pair a, b ∈M , d(a, b) = 0 if and only if a = b.
(2) For every pair a, b ∈M , d(a, b) = d(b, a).
(3) For every triple a, b, c ∈M , d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b).
For example, the set R of all real numbers is a metric space with metric
d(a, b) = |a− b|, where | · | is absolute value. The latter notion also could be
defined for arbitrary commutative ring R.
Definition 3.2 (Norm). A function ‖ · ‖ defined on the R and valuated in
R≥0 is called a norm whenever ‖ · ‖ satisfies the following conditions:
(1) For every a ∈ R, ‖a‖ = 0 if and only if a = 0.
(2) For every pair a, b ∈ R, ‖a · b‖ = ‖a‖ · ‖b‖.
(3) For every pair a, b ∈ R, ‖a+ b‖ ≤ ‖a‖+ ‖b‖.
It is easy to verify that assuming d(a, b) = ‖a− b‖ we define metric d on
the ring R. This metric d is called a metric induced by the norm ‖ · ‖.
Note that once the norm (whence, metric) on the ring R is defined, we
immediately define a notion of convergent sequence over R, a notion of limit,
a notion of continuous function defined on R and valuated in R, a notion of
derivative of a function, etc. For instance, element a ∈ R is a derivative of
the function f : R → R at the point x ∈ R if and only if for all sufficiently
small h ∈ R, h 6= 0, (that is, for ‖h‖ < δ for some real δ > 0)
f(x+ h) = f(x) + a · h+ λ(h),
where ‖λ(h)‖‖h‖ goes to 0 as ‖h‖ goes to 0. Thus, loosely speaking, every new
norm leads to a new Calculus.
3Mathematicians used to speak of metric rather than of distance, but distance is also
OK
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3.2. Norms on Z. We know that absolute value | · | is a norm on the ring Z
of all integers. The question arises, is | · | the only norm on Z? Surprisingly,
not!
Let p be a prime number. Using this p, we define now a norm ‖ · ‖p on Z.
Obviously, since ‖ − a‖ = ‖a‖ for every a ∈ R (this is an exercise to deduce
the identity from Definition 3.2!), it suffices to define ‖ · ‖p on the set N0 of
all non-negative integers. We assume ‖0‖p = 0. Now, if n > 0 is a natural
number, it has a unique representation as a product of powers of pairwise
distinct primes. Denote ordp n exponent of p in this representation and put
‖n‖p = p− ordp n. It is an exercise to verify that the so defined function is a
norm.
Indeed, (1) and (2) of Definition 3.2 obviously hold for the so defined
norm. Moreover, (3) holds in a stronger form:
(3′) For every pair a, b ∈ Z, ‖a+ b‖p ≤ max{‖a‖p, ‖b‖p}.
From here it obviously follows that the metric dp defined by the norm ‖ · ‖p
also satisfies a stronger relation than (3) of Definition 3.1:
(3′) For every triple a, b, c ∈ Z, dp(a, b) ≤ max{dp(a, c), dp(c, b)}.
The latter relation is called a strong triangle inequality, and a metric that
satisfies this inequality is called a non-Archimedean metric, or an ultramet-
ric. Accordingly, a metric space equipped with a non-Archimedean metric
is called a non-Archimedean metric space, or an ultrametric space.
3.3. p-adic integers. Clearly, for natural n ∈ N one can calculate ordp n
according to the following rule: Represent n in its base-p expansion, find the
least significant non-zero digit (let it be the i-th digit; enumeration starts
with zero); then ordp n = i. That is,
n = . . . ai+1ai 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i zeros
; ai 6= 0⇒ ‖n‖p = 1
pi
.
The latter definition could be expanded on the whole set Zp of infinite
strings of digits 0, 1, . . . , p− 1 in an obvious manner. Now it is not difficult
to prove that the set Zp is a commutative ring with respect to addition and
multiplication defined by ‘school-textbook’ algorithms, and, moreover, the
so defined function ‖ ·‖p is a norm on this ring!4 Elements of the ring Zp are
called p-adic integers. Actually, we think of the infinite string . . . aiai−1 . . . a0
over an alphabet {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} as of base-p expansion of a p-adic integer
a:
a = . . . aiai−1 . . . a0 =
∞∑
i=0
ai · pi (3.2.1)
Note that for a, b ∈ Zp dp(a, b) = 1pi for some i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (case
i =∞ just means that dp(a, b) = 0, whence, a = b). Moreover, dp(a, b) = 1pi
if and only if
a = . . . ai+1aici−1 . . . c0;
b = . . . bi+1bici−1 . . . c0,
4Prove this.
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and ai 6= bi. Using an obvious analogy with non-negative rational integers
we write in this case that a ≡ b (mod pi). Thus, dp(a, b) = 1pi where i is the
biggest non-negative rational integer such that a ≡ b (mod pi), and a 6≡ b
(mod pi+1). Throughout the course we denote the i-th digit (i = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
in a base-p expansion of a p-adic integer a ∈ Zp via δpi (a); that is, δpi (a) = ai,
cf. (3.2.1). We omit the superscript (especially in case p = 2) when it does
not lead to misunderstandings.
The ring Z2 of infinite binary strings mentioned above corresponds to the
case p = 2. Thus, Z2 is an ultrametric space with respect to the metric d2
defined by the norm ‖ · ‖2. And, indeed, with respect to this metric d2 the
sequence 1, 2, 4, . . . , 2n, . . . converges to 0 as n goes to infinity; whence5, the
sequence 1, 3, 7, . . . , 2n − 1, . . . indeed converges to −1.
Actually a processor works with approximations of 2-adic integers with
respect to 2-adic metric: When one tries to load a number which base-2
expansion contains more than n significant bits into a registry of an n-
processor, the processor just writes only n low order bits of the number
in a registry thus reducing the number modulo 2n. Thus, precision of the
approximation is defined by the bitlength of the processor.
Since the ring (metric space) Z2 is of most importance for us, we proceed
with some examples that illustrate our main notions with respect to Z2.
Sequences that contain only finite number of 1’s correspond to non-
negative rational integers represented by their base-2 expansions:
. . . 00011 = 3
Sequences that contain only finite number of 0’s correspond to negative
rational integers6:
. . . 111100 = −4
Sequences that are (eventually) periodic correspond to rational numbers
that could be represented by irreducible fractions with odd denominators7:
. . . 1010101 = −1
3
Non-periodic sequence correspond to no rational number.
An example one how we measure distances in Z2:
. . . 101010101︸︷︷︸ = −13
. . . 000000101︸︷︷︸ = 5

 =⇒ d2
(
− 1
3
, 5
)
=
1
24
=
1
16
That is, −13 ≡ 5 (mod 16);−13 6≡ 5 (mod 32).
3.4. Odd world. Finally we conclude that our computers live in the world
other than we human beings. This virtual world is very odd. In this subsec-
tion we only mention some facts about this virtual world to make it more
familiar to us. Proofs (and other peculiar facts) could be found in the above
mentioned books and monographs on p-adic analysis.
5To prove this we must prove a theorem on limit of sum of two convergent sequences
before. It is a good exercise to re-prove all classical theorems about limits of compositions
of sequences in general case, for arbitrary metric!
6Prove this
7Prove this
NON-ARCHIMEDEAN ANALYSIS, T -FUNCTIONS, AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 12
Our world, the world of real numbers R is Archimedean. That is, it
satisfies the Archimedean Axiom which read:
Given a segment S of real line of length s, and another
(smaller) segment L of length ℓ, ℓ < s, there exists a natural
number n such that n · ℓ > s. (That is, if we append a short
segment to itself sufficient number of times, we can make the
resulting segment arbitrarily long).
This axiom does not hold in the p-adic world Zp: Appending a segment
to itself we could make the resulting segment shorter than the original one!
For instance, let p = 2 and let L be some ‘segment of length 12 ’, say, L = 2
then doubling the segment (‘appending’ it to itself) we, obtain a ‘segment’
2 · L = 4, and for which we have ‖4‖2 = 12 . The ‘doubled segment’ is twice
as short as the original!
Of course, origin of this fact is hidden in a strong triangle inequality
(3′) that governs the non-Archimedean world. This inequality implies other
odd-looking facts, e.g.,
• All triangles are isosceles!
• Every point inside a ball is a center of this ball!
• The series ∑∞i=0 zi of p-adic integers are convergent if and only if
p
lim
i→∞
zi = 0 (where
p
lim
i→∞
) is a limit with respect to the p-adic norm
‖ · ‖p).
By the way, this implies that, say, ln(−3) = −∑∞i=1 4ii is a 2-adic integer!
If you are going to prove these statements (which is a good exercise!) note
that every ball of radius 1
pk
in Zp is of the form a+p
k ·Zp = {a+pk ·z : z ∈ Zp}.
By the way, from here it follows that, in case p = 2, a boundary of a (closed)
ball is itself a ball of radius 1
pk+1
; e.g., a sphere of radius 12 is a ball of radius
1
4 ! Actually, the whole metric space Zp is a ball of radius 1 (and is a p-adic
analog of a real unit interval). For those who is familiar with functional
analysis we mention also that the space Zp is complete with respect to the
p-adic distance (metric) dp, and compact.
4. Elements of applied 2-adic analysis
The main goal of this section is to provide some experience in Calculus
on Z2. We are not going to do this too formally since there are a number
of excellent books and monographs on p-adic analysis, e.g. [24, 20, 17, 12].
We rather focus on those functions and techniques that later in the course
will be used in our cryptographic applications, stream cipher design.
4.1. T -functions revisited. We start with 2-adic extensions of what we
called ‘basic instructions’. These are primarily arithmetic operations (ad-
dition, subtraction, multiplication) and bitwise logical operations. These
two set of operations are not mutually independent, some of them could
be expressed via others. The following identities could be proved: For all
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u, v ∈ Z2
NOT(u) = u XOR(−1);
NOT(u) + u = −1;
u XOR v = u+ v − 2(u AND v);
uOR v = u+ v − (u AND v);
uOR v = (u XOR v) + (u AND v).
(4.0.2)
During the course we often write ⊕ instead of XOR, also ⊙, & or ∧ in-
stead of AND, and ∨ instead of OR. These operations (with the only ex-
ception of NOT) are functions of two 2-adic variables. To work with these
functions we need to define 2-adic metric on a Cartesian square Z22. Hav-
ing already defined metric on Z2 we define metric on a Cartesian product
Zn2 = Z2 × · · · × Z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
in a standard manner: For a = (a(1), . . . , a(n)),b =
(b(1), . . . , b(n)) ∈ Zn2 we put ‖a‖2 = max{‖a(1)‖2, . . . , ‖a(n)‖2} and, respec-
tively, d2(a,b) = max{d2(a(1), b(1)), . . . , d2(a(n), b(n))}. We also write a ≡ b
(mod 2i) whenever a(j) ≡ b(j) (mod 2i) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Now it is a right time to consider T -functions as 2-adic mappings. Actu-
ally (see Definition 2.1) we define T -function as a special mapping that puts
into a correspondence to every sequence of columnarm-dimensional Boolean
vectors certain sequence of n-dimensional columnar Boolean vectors. Now
we can read these sequence not column after column, but as a row after a
row, starting with a top one. Each this row is an infinite sequence of zeros
and ones; that is, a 2-adic integer. Thus,
we can consider a T -function F from Definition 2.1 as a
mapping from Zm2 into Z
n
2 such that F (a) ≡ F (b) (mod 2i)
whenever a ≡ b (mod 2i).
From this observation immediately follows a very important theorem:
Theorem 4.1. T -functions are mappings from Zm2 into Z
n
2 that satisfy Lip-
schitz condition with a constant 1:
‖F (a)− F (b)‖2 ≤ ‖a− b‖2
and vise versa, all mappings that satisfy this condition are T -functions.
Corollary 4.2. All T -functions are continuous 2-adic functions.8
These easy claims are a hint that 2-adic analysis could be useful in study
of T -functions; of course, only of properties that are of ‘analytic nature’,
which could be properly stated in terms of analysis; that is, in terms of
limits, convergence, derivatives, etc. We have not stated still what are these
properties of T -functions that are crucial for cryptography. Yet, when we
state these properties a bit later, we see that fortunately they are of this
‘analytic nature’.
By the way, the above observation reflects a very specific algebraic nature
of T -functions. In general algebra, a congruence of an algebraic system is an
equivalence relation which is preserved by all operations of this system; that
8Any function that satisfy Lipschitz condition with respect to a certain metric is con-
tinuous with respect to this metric. Prove this!
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is, if replacing operands by equivalent elements the result of the operation
is equivalent to the original one. A function defined on (and valuated in)
the algebraic system is called compatible whenever this function preserves all
congruences of this algebraic system. The only congruences of the ring Zp
are congruences modulo pk for k = 1, 2, . . .. Thus, T -functions are merely
compatible functions on the ring Z2, so we start using the term ‘compatible’
along with (or instead of) the term ‘T -function’.
Actually, ‘T -function’ just means ‘compatible on the ring Z2’, and many
further results holds for functions that are compatible on Zp, p prime. A
p-adic compatible function is the function that satisfies p-adic Lipschitz con-
dition with a constant 1, and vise versa.
4.2. More compatible functions. We already know that arithmetic oper-
ations (addition, subtraction, and multiplication), as well as bitwise logical
operations (XOR, AND, etc.) are T -functions (that is, compatible 2-adic func-
tions). Obviously, a composition of compatible functions is a compatible
function. Whence, natural examples of compatible functions are polyno-
mials with p-adic integer coefficients. That is, all polynomials with integer
coefficients are T -functions!
With some extra efforts one could prove also that some other ‘natural’
functions are also T -functions:
exponentiation, ↑: (u, v) 7→ u ↑ v = (1 + 2 · u)v; in particular,
raising to negative powers, u ↑ (−r) = (1 + 2 · u)−r, r ∈ N; and
division, / : u/v = u · (v ↑ (−1)) = u
1 + 2 · v .
(4.2.1)
That is, these functions are well defined on Z2, and satisfy 2-adic Lipschitz
condition with a constant 1. Use of compositions of these functions with
the above mentioned bitwise logical instruction results in very wild-lloking
functions, like this one:
(1 + x) XOR 4 ·
(
1− 2 · x AND x
2 + x3 ORx4
3− 4 · (5 + 6x5)x6 XORx7
)7− 8x8
9+10x9
Despite this function could be easily evaluated on every digital computer
(since this function is continuous in a computer’s 2-adic world), we do not
insist on using it (and similar) functions in applications: Compositions of
the above mentioned functions may not be of big importance for cryptog-
raphy since their program implementations are usually slow, yet they are
of theoretical interest and often arise in studies. The p-adic analogs of the
above functions could be naturally defined (write p instead of 2).
It also worth notice here that (1 + p · v)−1 = ∑∞i=0(−1)i+1pivi, and the
series in the right-hand part of this equality are convergent for every v ∈ Zp.
We can describe univariate T -functions in some general way. It turns out
that each function f : N0 → Zp (or, respectively, f : N0 → Z) admits one and
only one representation in the form of so-called Mahler interpolation series
f(x) =
∞∑
i=0
ai
(
x
i
)
, (4.2.2)
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where
(x
i
)
= x(x−1)···(x−i+1)i! for i = 1, 2, . . ., and
(x
0
)
= 1; ai ∈ Zp (respec-
tively, ai ∈ Z), i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
If f is uniformly continuous on N0 with respect to p-adic distance, it can
be uniquely expanded to a uniformly continuous function on Zp. Hence
the interpolation series for f converges uniformly on Zp. The following is
true: The series f(x) =
∑∞
i=0 ai
(x
i
)
, (ai ∈ Zp, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) converges
uniformly on Zp iff
p
lim
i→∞
ai = 0, where
p
lim is a limit with respect to the p-adic
distance; hence uniformly convergent series defines a uniformly continuous
function on Zp.
The following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.3. The function f : Zp → Zp represented by (4.2.2) is compat-
ible if and only if
ai ≡ 0 (mod p⌊logp i⌋)
for all i = p, p+1, p+2, . . . . (Here and after for a real α we denote ⌊α⌋ an
integral part of α, i.e., the nearest to α rational integer not exceeding α.)
4.3. Derivatives modulo pk. In this subsection we generalize the main
notion of Calculus, a derivative. By the definition, for a = (a1, . . . , an)
and b = (b1, . . . , bn) of Z
(n)
p the congruence a ≡ b (mod ps) means that
‖ai − bi‖p ≤ p−s (or, the same, that ai = bi + cips for suitable ci ∈ Zp,
i = 1, 2, . . . , s); that is ‖a− b‖p ≤ p−s.
Definition 4.4 (Derivations modulo pk). A function
F = (f1, . . . , fm) : Z
n
p → Zmp
is called differentiable modulo pk at the point u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Znp iff there
exist a positive integer rational N and an n×mmatrix F ′k(u) over Zp (which
is called the Jacobi matrix modulo pk of the function F at the point u) such
that for each positive rational integerK ≥ N and each h = (h1, . . . , hn) ∈ Znp
the inequality ‖h‖p ≤ p−K implies a congruence
F (u+ h) ≡ F (u) + h · F ′k(u) (mod pk+K). (4.4.1)
In case m = 1 the Jacobi matrix modulo pk is called a differential modulo
pk. In casem = n a determinant of the Jacobi matrix modulo pk is called the
Jacobian modulo pk. The entries of the Jacobi matrix modulo pk are called
partial derivatives modulo pk of the function F at the point u. A partial
derivative (respectively, a differential) modulo pk we sometimes denote as
∂kfi(u)
∂kxj
(respectively, as dkF (u) =
∑n
i=1
∂kF (u)
∂kxi
dkxi).
It could be proved that whenever F is compatible, then, if F is differ-
entiable modulo pk at some point, the entries of the Jacobi matrix are
necessarily p-adic integers (such functions are said to have integer-valued
derivative).
Since the notion of function that is differentiable modulo pk is of high
importance in theory that follows, we discuss this notion in details. First of
all, we compare this notion to a classical notion of differentiable function.
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Compare to differentiability, the differentiability modulo pk is a weaker
restriction. As a matter of fact, in a univariate case (m = n = 1), definition
4.4 just yields that
F (u+ h)− F (u)
h
≈ F ′k(u)
Note that this ≈ (‘approximately’) implies the following:
≈ with arbitrarily high precision⇒ differentiability;
≈ with precision not worse than p−k ⇒ differentiability mod pk.
It is obvious that whenever a function is differentiable (and its derivative
is a p-adic integer), it is differentiable modulo pk for all k = 1, 2, . . ., and in
this case the derivative modulo pk is just a reduction of a derivative modulo
pk (note that according to definition 4.4 partial derivatives modulo pk are
determined up to a summand that is 0 modulo pk).
For functions with integer-valued derivatives modulo pk the ‘rules of
derivation modulo pk’ have the same (up to congruence modulo pk in-
stead of equality) form as for classical derivations. For instance, if both
functions G : Zsp → Znp and F : Znp → Zmp are differentiable modulo pk at
the points, respectively, v = (v1, . . . , vs) and u = G(v), and their partial
derivatives modulo pk at these points are p-adic integers, then a composition
F ◦G : Zsp → Zmp of these functions is uniformly differentiable modulo pk at
the point v, all its partial derivatives modulo pk at this point are p-adic
integers, and (F ◦G)′k(v) ≡ G′k(v)F ′k(u) (mod pk).
By the analogy with classical case we can give the following
Definition 4.5. A function F : Znp → Zmp is said to be uniformly differ-
entiable modulo pk on Z
(n)
p iff there exists K ∈ N such that (4.4.1) holds
simultaneously for all u ∈ Znp as soon as ‖hi‖p ≤ p−K , (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The
least such K ∈ N is denoted via Nk(F ).
It could be shown that all partial derivatives modulo pk of a uniformly dif-
ferentiable modulo pk function F are periodic functions with period pNk(F )
(see [3, Proposition 2.12]). This in particular implies that each partial de-
rivative modulo pk could be considered as a function defined on the residue
ring Z/pNk(F )Z modulo pNk(F ). Moreover, if a continuation F˜ of the func-
tion F = (f1, . . . , fm) : N
n
0 → Nm0 to the space Znp is uniformly differen-
tiable modulo pk on the Znp , then one could continue both the function F
and all its (partial) derivatives modulo pk to the space Znp simultaneously.
This implies that we could study if necessary (partial) derivatives modulo
pk of the function F˜ instead of studying those of F and vise versa. For
example, a partial derivative ∂kfi(u)∂kxj modulo p
k vanishes modulo pk at no
point of Znp (that is,
∂kfi(u)
∂kxj
6≡ 0 (mod pk) for all u ∈ Znp , or, the same∥∥∂kfi(u)
∂kxj
∥∥
p
> p−k everywhere on Znp) if and only if
∂kfi(u)
∂kxj
6≡ 0 (mod pk) for
all u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pNk(F ) − 1}.
To calculate a derivative of, for instance, a T -function that is a com-
position of basic instructions one needs to know derivatives of these basic
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instructions (i.e., arithmetic, bitwise logical, etc.) Thus, we briefly introduce
a p-adic analog of a ‘table of derivatives’ of classical Calculus.
Examples 4.6. Derivatives of bitwise logical operations.
(1) the function f(x) = x AND c is uniformly differentiable on Z2 for
any c ∈ Z; f ′(x) = 0 for c ≥ 0, and f ′(x) = 1 for c < 0, since
f(x+2ns) = f(x), and f(x+2ns) = f(x)+2ns for n ≥ l(|c|), where
l(|c|) is the bit length of absolute value of c (mind that for c ≥ 0
the 2-adic representation of −c starts with 2l(c)− c in less significant
bits followed by . . . 11: −1 = . . . 11, −3 = . . . 11101 , etc.).
(2) the function f(x) = x XOR c is uniformly differentiable on Z2 for any
c ∈ Z; f ′(x) = 1 for c ≥ 0, and f ′(x) = −1 for c < 0. This
immediately follows from (1) since u XOR v = u+ v − 2(x AND v) (see
(4.0.2)); thus (x XOR c)′ = x′ + c′ − 2(x AND c)′ = 1 + 2 · (0, for c ≥
0; or − 1, for c < 0).
(3) in the same manner it could be shown that functions (x mod 2n) =
x AND(2n−1) (a reduction modulo 2n), NOT(x) and (xOR c) for c ∈ Z
are uniformly differentiable on Z2, and (x mod 2
n)′ = 0, (NOT x)′ =
−1, (xOR c)′ = 1 for c ≥ 0, (xOR c)′ = 0 for c < 0.
(4) the function f(x, y) = x XOR y is not uniformly differentiable on Z22,
yet it is uniformly differentiable modulo 2 on Z22; from (2) it follows
that its partial derivatives modulo 2 are 1 everywhere on Z22.
Here how it works altogether:
Example. The function f(x) = x + (x2 OR 5) is uniformly differentiable on
Z2, and f
′(x) = 1 + 2x · (xOR 5)′ = 1 + 2x.
The function F (x, y) = (f(x, y), g(x, y)) = (x ⊕ 2(x ∧ y), (y + 3x3) ⊕ x)
is uniformly differentiable modulo 2 as bivariate function, and N1(F ) = 1;
namely
F (x+ 2nt, y + 2ms) ≡ F (x, y) + (2nt, 2ms) ·
(
1 x+ 1
0 1
)
(mod 2k+1)
for all m,n ≥ 1 (here k = min{m,n}). The matrix
(
1 x+ 1
0 1
)
= F ′1(x, y)
is Jacobi matrix modulo 2 of F ; here how we calculate partial deriva-
tives modulo 2: for instance, ∂1g(x,y)∂1x =
∂1(y+3x3)
∂1x
· ∂1(u⊕x)∂1u
∣∣
u=y+3x3
+ ∂1x∂1x ·
∂1(u⊕x)
∂1x
∣∣
u=y+3x3
= 9x2 · 1+ 1 · 1 ≡ x+1 (mod 2). Note that a partial deriv-
ative modulo 2 of the function 2(x∧ y) is always 0 modulo 2 because of the
multiplier 2: The function x ∧ y is not differentiable modulo 2 as bivariate
function, yet 2(x ∧ y) is. So the Jacobian of the function F is detF ′1 ≡ 1
(mod 2).
Now let F = (f1, . . . , fm) : Z
n
p → Zmp and f : Znp → Zp be compatible
functions, which are uniformly differentiable on Znp modulo p. This is a
relatively weak restriction since all uniformly differentiable on Znp functions,
as well as functions, which are uniformly differentiable on Znp modulo p
k
for some k ≥ 1, are uniformly differentiable on Znp modulo p; note that
∂F
∂xi
≡ ∂kF∂kxi ≡
∂k−1F
∂k−1xi
(mod pk−1). Moreover, as it was mentioned, all values
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of all partial derivatives modulo pk (and thus, modulo p) of F and f are
p-adic integers everywhere on, respectively, Znp and Zp, so to calculate these
values one can use the techniques considered above.
5. Stream ciphers and 2-adic ergodic theory
In this section we discuss what conditions state update and output func-
tions of a pseudorandom generator should satisfy to guarantee some crucial
cryptographic properties of the produced sequence. It turns out that when-
ever these functions are T -functions, the properties are tightly connected
with the behaviour of the functions with respect to a natural probabilistic
measure on the space Z2. We start with defining this measure.
5.1. Notions of p-adic dynamics. When we measure a square of a figure
on a plane (or a volume of a body in a space), we associate a real number
to the figure (resp., to the body). These are natural examples of measures.
We are not going to recall basic notions of measure theory here, referring to
any book on this topic. We only mention that we could define a measure
µ on some set S by assigning non-negative real numbers to some subsets
that are called elementary. All other measurable subsets are compositions of
these elementary subsets with respect to countable unions, intersections, and
complements. Actually, if a measurable subset S ⊂ S is a disjoint union of
elementary measurable subsets Ej, S = ∪∞j=0Ej , then µ(S) =
∑∞
j=0 µ(Ej),
and the series in the right-hand part must be convergent. The set S with so
defined measure µ is called a measurable space.
The elementary subsets in Zp are balls Bp−k(a) = a+ p
kZp. To each such
ball we assign a number µp(Bp−k(a)) =
1
pk
. It could be verified that we
indeed define a measure on the space Zp, and this measure is a probabilistic
measure, µp(Zp) = 1. This measure µp is called a (normalized) Haar measure
on Zp.
We say that we have a dynamical system on a measurable space S, when-
ever we consider a triple (S;µ; f), where S is a measurable space with mea-
sure µ, and f : S → S is a measurable function; that is, an f -preimage of
every measurable subset is a measurable subset. Dynamical system theory
is a reach mathematical theory which is applied in different parts of science
and industry. As a matter of fact, in this course we will discuss applications
of 2-adic dynamical systems theory to stream cipher design.
A trajectory of a dynamical system is a sequence
x0, x1 = f(x0), . . . , xi = f(xi−1) = f
i(x0), . . .
of points of the space S, x0 is called an initial point of the trajectory. If
F : S→ T is a measurable mapping to some other measurable space T with
a measure ν (that is, an F -preimage of any ν-measurable subset of T is a
µ-measurable subset of X), the sequence F (x0), F (x1), F (x2), . . . is called
an observable. Note that the trajectory formally looks like the sequence of
states of a pseudorandom generator, whereas the observable resembles the
output sequence, cf. subsection 2.1. Further we will see that is not just an
analogy.
The two important notions of dynamical systems theory follow: A map-
ping F : S→ Y of a measurable space S into a measurable space Y endowed
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with probabilistic measure µ and ν, respectively, is said to be measure-
preserving (or, sometimes, equiprobable) whenever µ(F−1(S)) = ν(S) for
each measurable subset S ⊂ Y. In case S = Y and µ = ν, a measure-
preserving mapping F is said to be ergodic whenever for each measurable
subset S such that F−1(S) = S holds either µ(S) = 1 or µ(S) = 0. Loosely
speaking, any invariant set of the ergodic mapping is either nothing, or
everything.
The p-adic ergodic theory studies ergodic (with respect to the Haar mea-
sure) transformations of the space of p-adic numbers, conditions that provide
ergodicity, etc. It is a rapidly developing mathematical theory, with vari-
ous applications, see e.g. [13]. Actually, as we will see, the course is a
development of p-adic ergodic theory with special interest to pseudorandom
number generators (particulary, stream ciphers).9 And now it is a right time
to discuss how the above notions are related to properties of pseudorandom
generators.
5.2. What is a good PRNG. A PRNG which could be considered any
good obviously must meet the following conditions:
• The output sequence must be pseudorandom (i.e., must pass certain
statistical tests).
• For cryptographic applications, given a segment zj , zj+1, . . . , zj+s−1
of the output sequence, finding the corresponding initial state (which
usually is a key) must be infeasible in some properly defined sense.
• The PRNG must be suitable for software (or hardware) implemen-
tation; the performance must be sufficiently fast.
In case the PRNG is an automaton described by Figure 1 we could re-state
these conditions as follows:
First of all, we state
Condition 1: The state update function f must provide pseu-
dorandomness; in particular, it must guarantee uniform dis-
tribution and long period of the state update sequence {ui}.
It would be great if this sequence is secure; that is, given ui, it is infeasible
neither to find (or to predict) ui+1, nor to find u0. Unfortunately, this is
not easy to provide these properties: Generators that are ‘provably secure’,
that is, supplied with proofs (which are based on some plausible, yet still
unproven conjectures) that their output sequences can not be predicted by
polynomial-time algorithms, are too slow for most practical applications.
In real life one has to undertake additional efforts to make the algorithm
secure. Usually this could be achieved with the use of the output function.
Thus, we need
Condition 2: The output function F must not spoil pseu-
dorandomness (at least, the output sequence {zi} must be
uniformly distributed and must have long period).
Moreover, in cryptographic applications the function F
must make the PRNG secure: (in particular, given zi, it
must be difficult to find ui from the equation zi = F (ui)).
9By the way, methods developed within this approach could be applied to solve some
problems of p-adic ergodic theory, see [1]
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Finally, we can formulate
Condition 3: To make the PRNG any suitable for software/hardware
implementations, both f and G must be compositions of ba-
sic processor instructions.
In section 2 we already have discussed how one could satisfy condition 3:
It is sufficient to choose both f and F from the class of T -functions. Thus,
we can assume that f : Z/2nZ→ Z/2nZ and F : Z/2nZ→ Z/2mZ (usually,
m ≤ n).
Now, to satisfy condition 1, one could take the state update function
f : Z/2nZ → Z/2nZ with a single cycle property; that is, f permutes ele-
ments of Z/2nZ cyclically.
The state update sequence
u0, u1 = f(u0), . . . , ui+1 = f(ui) = f
i+1(u0), . . .
of n-bit words will have then the longest possible period (of length 2n), and
strict uniform distribution; that is, each n-bit word will occur at the period
exactly once.
To satisfy the first part of condition 2, one could take the output func-
tion F : Z/2nZ → Z/2mZ to be balanced: That is, to each m-bit word the
mapping F maps the same number of n-bit words (that’s why m ≤ n).
For m = n balanced mappings are just invertible (that is, bijective, one-
to-one) mappings. Obviously, if a balanced output function is applied to a
strictly uniformly distributed sequence of states, the output sequence (of m-
bit words) is also strictly uniformly distributed: It is periodic with a period
of length 2n, and each m-bit word occurs at the period exactly 2n−m times.
For m ≪ n, balanced functions could serve us to satisfy the second part
of condition 2, since the equation yi = G(xi) has too many solutions then,
2n−m (so it is infeasible to an attacker to try them all).
Thus, we must know how to construct balanced (or single-cycle) functions
out of basic processor instructions. This is where the non-Archimedean
analysis comes into play!
5.3. A bridge. Now we make our studies more formal. Let F : Znp → Zmp be
a compatible function; that is, let F satisfy the p-adic Lipschitz condition
with a constant 1 (see section 4). In other words, for every k = 1, 2, . . .,
and for every a,b ∈ Znp , F (a) ≡ F (b) (mod pk) whenever a ≡ b (mod pk)
(see subsection 4.3 for the definition of modpk). This means that, given a
compatible mapping F : Znp → Zmp , its reduction F mod pk modulo pk is a
well defined mapping
F mod pk : (Z/pkZ)n → (Z/pkZ)m
of respective Cartesian powers of the residue ring Z/pkZ. We call the map-
ping F mod pk the induced mapping. The idea is quite clear: Reduction
modulo pk just deletes all most significant digits (starting with the k-th
digit) both of arguments and of values of the function F .
Definition 5.1. A compatible mapping F : Zp → Zp is said to be bijective
(resp., transitive) modulo pk iff the induced mapping x 7→ F (x) (mod pk) is
a (single-cycle) permutation of the elements of the ring Z/pkZ.
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Balance modulo pk could be defined by an analogy. Now we can state the
central result of this section:
Theorem 5.2 (see [5]). For m = n = 1, a compatible mapping F : Znp →
Zmp preserves the normalized Haar measure µp on Zp (resp., is ergodic with
respect to µp) if and only if it is bijective (resp., transitive) modulo p
k for
all k = 1, 2, 3, . . . .
For n ≥ m, the mapping F preserves the measure µp if and only if it in-
duces a balanced mapping of (Z/pkZ)n onto (Z/pkZ)m, for all k = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
This theorem acts like a bridge between p-adic ergodic theory and stream
cipher design: We consider the corresponding PRNG as approximation with
respect to 2-adic metric of some ergodic dynamical system on 2-adic integers.
In a pseudorandom generator, we can take compatible ergodic functions
for state update functions; also we can take compatible measure-preserving
functions for output functions. The reduction modulo 2n a computer per-
forms automatically. In particular, for p = 2 from theorem 5.2 we obtain:
• measure preservation = invertibility modulo 2k for all k ∈ N;
• in dimensions > 1, i.e., for F : Zn2 → Zm2 ,
measure preservation = balance modulo 2k for all k ∈ N;
• ergodicity = single cycle property modulo 2k for all k ∈ N.
In other words, a compatible function F : Z2 → Z2 is measure-preserving (re-
spectively, ergodic) if and only if the corresponding T -function F (mod 2n)
on n-bit words (which is merely an approximation of F with precision 12n )
is invertible or, respectively, has a single cycle property!
Now the problem is how to describe these measure-preserving (in partic-
ular, ergodic) mappings in the class of all compatible mappings. We start
to develop some theory to answer the following questions: What composi-
tions of basic instructions are measure-preserving? are ergodic? Given a
composition of basic instructions, is it measure-preserving? is it ergodic?
6. Tools
The main goal of this section is to describe some tools with the use of
which we could answer the above stated questions. However, we start with
some historical observations.
6.1. A phenomenon. Study of pseudorandom generators has a long his-
tory. You can read about this issue in, for instance, an excellent book of
Donald Knuth [16]. Here we discuss briefly a short passage of this long story,
aiming to make some important observations.
One could notice that behavior of a mapping modulo pN , where N is big,
is totally determined by the behavior of this mapping modulo pn, where n
is small. One of the first generators that demonstrate this behaviour is
Linear Congruential Generator (Hull and Dobell, 1962):
The mapping
x 7→ a · x+ b (mod pN),
where a, b ∈ Z, N ≥ 2, is a permutation with a single cycle property if and
only if x 7→ a · x+ b (mod pn) is a permutation with a single cycle property
for n = 1 in case p odd, or for n = 2, otherwise.
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The following important example is
Bijectivity Criterion for Polynomials with Integer Coefficients (proved and
re-proved by a number of authors; known since 1960th):
The mapping
x 7→ f(x) (mod pN ),
where N ≥ 2 and f is a polynomial with rational integer coefficients, is
bijective if and only if x 7→ f(x) (mod pn) is bijective for n = 2.
Yet another one example:
Quadratic Generator (Coveyou, 1969):
The mapping
x 7→ f(x) (mod pN ),
where N ≥ 3 and f is a quadratic polynomial with rational integer coeffi-
cients, is a permutation with a single cycle property iff x 7→ f(x) (mod pn)
is a permutation with a single cycle property for n = 3 in case p ∈ {2, 3} ,
or for n = 2, otherwise.
It worth notice here that in 1980th M. V. Larin proved that the word
‘quadratic’ in the statement could be omitted! The result was spread as a
manuscript that time, a journal publication [18] appeared much later.
6.2. Explanation: p-adic derivations. Looking at the examples of the
preceding subsection, we naturally start suspecting that some very strong
reason for such behaviour must exist! The following theorem, which was
published in 1993 [4, 3], gives an explanation:
Theorem 6.1. Let a compatible function F : Zp → Zp be uniformly differ-
entiable modulo p2. Then F is ergodic if and only if it is transitive modulo
pN2(F )+1 for odd prime p or, respectively, modulo 2N2(F )+2 for p = 2.
This theorem works for a much wider class of functions that the ones
mentioned in the above examples. Actually, this class includes functions
that are compositions of not exceptionally arithmetic operations, but of
logical operations as well. To illustrate the techniques, consider the following
example.
Example 6.2. In their paper [15] of 2002 Klimov and Shamir write that
...neither the invertibility nor the cycle structure of x+(x2∨5)
could be determined by his (i.e., mine — V.A.) techniques.
See however how it could be immediately done with the use of Theorem 6.1:
The function f(x) = x+(x2∨5) is uniformly differentiable on Z2, thus, it is
uniformly differentiable modulo 4 (see 4.6 and an example thereafter), and
N2(f) = 3. Indeed, (x+h)OR 5 = (xOR 5)+h whenever h ≡ 0 (mod 8) (the
latter congruence is obvious since the base-2 expansion of 5 is ...000101).
Now to prove that f is ergodic, in view of 6.1 it suffices to demonstrate
that f induces a permutation with a single cycle on Z/32. Direct calculations
show that the string
0, f(0) mod 32, f2(0) mod 32 = f(f(0)) mod 32, . . . , f31(0) mod 32
is a permutation of the string 0, 1, 2, . . . , 31, thus ending the proof.
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In connection with Theorem 6.1, the following natural question arises:
What about ergodicity in higher dimensions? Unfortunately, for uniformly
differentiable modulo p function the answer is negative. The following re-
sult could be considered as a non-existence theorem for compatible smooth
ergodic mappings in higher dimensions.
Theorem 6.3 (see [4, 3]). Let the function F = (f1, . . . , fn) : Z
n
p → Znp
be compatible, ergodic, and uniformly differentiable modulo p on Zp. Then
n = 1.
Note. Non-differentiable modp ones do exist for n > 1
The following theorem, which uses derivations modulo p instead of p2,
could be applied to construct balanced mappings to serve as output functions
of PRNG.
Theorem 6.4 (see [5]). Let F : Znp → Zmp be a compatible function that is
uniformly differentiable modulo p. Then F preserves measure whenever it
is balanced modulo pk for some k ≥ N1(F ) and the rank of its Jacobi matrix
F ′1(u) modulo p is exactly m at all points u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ (Z/pk)n.
Proof. For ξ ∈ (Z/ps)m denote
F−1s (ξ) = {γ ∈ (Z/ps)n : F (γ) ≡ ξ (mod ps)}.
Let s ≥ k ≥ N1(F ). Since F is compatible, and hence F is a sum of a
compatible function and a periodic function with period pN1(F ) (see 2.10 of
[3]), we conclude that if η ∈ F−1s+1(ξ), then η¯ ∈ F−1s (ξ¯). Here and further we
denote via α¯ = (α¯1, . . . , α¯m) ∈ (Z/ps)m the residue modulo ps, α mod ps =
(α1 mod p
s, . . . , αm mod p
s), where α = (α1, . . . , αm) ∈ (Z/ps+1)m.
Put λ = η¯ + psσ ∈ (Z/ps+1)n, where σ ∈ (Z/p)n. In view of the uniform
differentiability of the function F modulo p (see 4.4), we have
F (λ) ≡ F (η) + psσF ′1(η¯) (mod ps+1). (6.4.1)
Since F (η¯) ≡ ξ¯ + pkβ (mod ps+1) and ξ = ξ¯ + psγ for suitable β, γ ∈
(Z/p)(m), in view of (6.4.1) we conclude that λ ∈ F−1s+1(ξ) if and only if
λ¯ ∈ F−1s (ξ) (i.e., η¯ ∈ F−1s (ξ)) and α satisfies the following system of linear
equations over a finite field Z/p:
β + αF ′1(η¯) = γ. (6.4.2)
Thus, if columns of the matrix F ′1(η¯) are linearly independent over Z/p,
then linear system (6.4.2) has exactly pn−m pairwise distinct solutions for
arbitrary β, γ ∈ (Z/p)(m). From here it follows that
|F−1s+1(ξ)| = |F−1s (ξ)|pn−m. (6.4.3)
Hence, if F is equiprobable modulo pk (i.e., if |F−1s (ξ¯)| does not depend
on ξ¯) and if rank of the matrix F ′1(η¯) is m, then (6.4.3) implies that F is
balanced modulo ps+1. 
Corollary 6.5. Under assumptions of theorem 6.4:
• If m = 1, then F is measure-preserving whenever F is balanced
modulo pk for some k ≥ N1(F ), and the differential d1F modulo p
of the function F vanishes at no point of (Z/pk|Z)n.
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• Let f(x1, . . . , xn) be a polynomial in variables x1, . . . , xn, and let all
coefficients of f are p-adic integers. The polynomial f preserves
measure whenever it is balanced modulo p and all its partial deriva-
tives vanishes simultaneously modulo p at no point of (Z/pZ)n (i.e.,
are simultaneously congruent to 0 modulo p nowhere) on (Z/pZ)n.
For m = n the above stated sufficient conditions of measure preservation
becomes also necessary ones.
Theorem 6.6. A compatible and uniformly differentiable modulo p function
F = (f1, . . . , fm) : Z
n
p → Znp
preserves measure if and only if it is bijective modulo pN1(F ) and its Jacobian
modulo p vanishes at no point of (Z/pN1(F )Z)n (Equivalent condition: If and
only if F is bijective modulo pN1(F )+1).
Proof. If F is bijective modulo pN1(F ), and if its Jacobian modulo p vanishes
nowhere on (Z/pN1(F ))n, then in view of Theorem 6.4 F preserves measure.
Vise versa, let F preserve measure, i.e., let F be bijective modulo pk
for all k ≥ N , where N is some positive rational integer. Now take k ≥
max{N,N1(F )}, then the definition of uniform differentiability modulo p
implies that
F (u+ pkα) ≡ F (u) + pkαF ′1(u) (mod pk+1) (6.6.1)
for all u, α ∈ Zp. Here F ′1(u) is an n×nmatrix over a field Z/p. If detF ′1(u) ≡
0 (mod p) for some u ∈ Znp (or, the same, for some u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pN1(F )−1}n
in view of the periodicity of partial derivatives modulo p), then there exists
α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}n, α 6≡ (0, . . . , 0) (mod p), such that αF ′1(u) ≡ (0, . . . , 0)
(mod p). But then (6.6.1) implies that F (u+pkα) ≡ F (u) (mod pk+1). The
latter contradicts the bijectivity modulo pk+1 of the function F , since for
u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pN1(F ) − 1}n we have u, u + pkα ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pk+1 − 1}n and
u+ pkα 6= u.
Now we prove the criterion in the equivalent form. Let F be bijective
modulo pN1(F ). Then assuming k = N1(F ) in the above argument, we
conclude that detF ′1(u) 6≡ 0 (mod p) for all u ∈ Znp . According to Theorem
6.4, this implies that F preserves measure.
Let F preserve measure, and let F be not bijective modulo pk for some
k ≥ N1(F ). We prove that in this case F is not bijective modulo pk+1.
Choose u, v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pk−1}n such that u 6= v F (u) ≡ F (v) (mod pk).
Then either F (u) ≡ F (v) (mod pk+1) (i.e., F is not bijective modulo pk+1),
or F (u) 6≡ F (v) (mod pk+1). Yet in the latter case we have F (u) ≡ F (v) +
pkα (mod pk+1) for some α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}n, α 6≡ (0, . . . , 0) (mod p).
Consider u1 = u + p
kβ, where β ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}n with β 6≡ (0, . . . , 0)
(mod p) and βF ′1(u) + α ≡ (0, . . . , 0) (mod p). Such β exists, since F pre-
serves measure and, consequently, detF ′1(u) 6≡ 0 (mod p), as this have been
proven already. Now the definition of uniform differentiability modulo p
implies that
F (u+pkβ) ≡ F (u)+pkβF ′1(u) ≡ F (v)+pkα+pkβF ′1(u) ≡ F (v) (mod pk+1),
(6.6.2)
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where u+ pkβ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pk+1− 1}(n) and u+ pkα 6= v (since u 6= v). Thus
(6.6.2) in combination with our assumption imply that F is not bijective
modulo pk+1. Applying this argument sufficient number of times, we con-
clude that F is not bijective modulo ps for all s ≥ k. But at the same time
F preserves measure. A contradiction. 
Comparing theorems 6.4 and 6.6 one may ask whether sufficient conditions
of theorem 6.4 are also necessary. The answer is negative: In [5] it is proved
that the function f(x, y) = 2x+ y3 on Z2 provides a counter-example.
Open question. Characterize all compatible measure-preserving mappings
F = (f1, . . . , fm) : Z
n
p → Znp
with m < n. The answer is not known even under restriction that all fi are
polynomials over Zp.
The technique presented in this subsection is rather effective: Actually,
all the examples of preceding subsection could be deduced from the results
of this subsection. Moreover, all results of [15] also could be proved by these
techniques. We re-prove these results to illustrate our techniques:
Examples 6.7. The following is true:
(1) A mapping
(x, y) 7→ F (x, y) = (x⊕ 2(x ∧ y), (y + 3x3)⊕ x) mod 2r
of (Z/2r)2 onto (Z/2r)2 is bijective for all r = 1, 2, . . .
Indeed, the function F is bijective modulo 2N1(F ) = 2 (direct
verification) and det(F ′1(u)) ≡ 1 (mod 2) for all u ∈ (Z/2)2 (see 4.6
and example thereafter).
(2) The following mappings of Z/2r onto Z/2r are bijective for all r =
1, 2, . . .:
x 7→ (x+ 2x2) mod2r,
x 7→ (x+ (x2 ∨ 1)) mod2r,
x 7→ (x⊕ (x2 ∨ 1)) mod2r.
Indeed, all three mappings are uniformly differentiable modulo 2,
and N1 = 1 for all of them. So it suffices to prove that all three
mappings are bijective modulo 2, i.e. as mappings of the residue
ring Z/2 modulo 2 onto itself (this could be checked by direct cal-
culations), and that their derivatives modulo 2 vanish at no point of
Z/2. The latter also holds, since the derivatives are, respectively,
1 + 4x ≡ 1 (mod 2),
1 + 2x · 1 ≡ 1 (mod 2),
1 + 2x · 1 ≡ 1 (mod 2),
since (x2 ∨ 1)′ = 2x · 1 ≡ 1 (mod 2), and (x⊕C)′1 ≡ 1 (mod 2), (see
4.6).
(3) The following closely related variants of the previous mappings of
Z/2r onto Z/2r are not bijective for all r = 1, 2, . . .:
x 7→ (x+ x2) mod2r,
x 7→ (x+ (x2 ∧ 1)) mod2r,
x 7→ (x+ (x3 ∨ 1)) mod2r,
NON-ARCHIMEDEAN ANALYSIS, T -FUNCTIONS, AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 26
since they are compatible but not bijective modulo 2.
(4) (see [21], also [15, Theorem 1]) Let P (x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ adxd be
a polynomial with integral coefficients. Then P (x) is a permutation
polynomial (i.e., is bijective) modulo 2n, n > 1 if and only if a1 is
odd, (a2 + a4 + · · · ) is even, and (a3 + a5 + · · · ) is even.
In view of 6.6 we must verify whether the two conditions hold:
first, whether P is bijective modulo 2, and second, whether P ′(z) ≡ 1
(mod 2) for z ∈ {0, 1}. The first condition implies that P (0) = a0
and P (1) = a0 + a1 + a2 + · · · ad must be distinct modulo 2; hence
a1 + a2 + · · · ad ≡ 1 (mod 2). The second condition implies that
P ′(0) = a1 ≡ 1 (mod 2), P ′(1) ≡ a1 + a3 + a5 + · · · ≡ 1 (mod 2).
Now combining all this together we get a2+ a3+ · · · ad ≡ 0 (mod 2)
and a3 + a5 + · · · ≡ 0 (mod 2), hence a2 + a4 + · · · ≡ 0 (mod 2).
(5) As a bonus, we can use exactly the same proof to get exactly the
same characterization of bijective modulo 2r (r = 1, 2, . . .) mappings
of the form x 7→ P (x) = a0 ⊕ a1x ⊕ · · · ⊕ adxd mod 2r since u ⊕ v
is uniformly differentiable modulo 2 as bivariate function, and its
derivative modulo 2 is exactly the same as the derivative of u + v,
and besides, u⊕ v ≡ u+ v (mod 2).
Note that in general theorems 6.4 and 6.6 could be applied to a class
of functions that is narrower than the class of all compatible functions.
However, it turns out that for p = 2 this is not the case. Namely, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 6.8. ([3, Corollary 4.6], [4, Corollary 4.4]) If a compatible
function g : Z2 → Z2 preserves measure then it is uniformly differentiable
modulo 2, and its derivative modulo 2 is always 1 modulo 2.
The above results are good to verify whether a given function preserves
measure or is ergodic. However, we need more tools to construct measure-
preserving, (respectively, ergodic) mappings in explicit form.
6.3. Mahler’s series. We already have mentioned that uniformly continu-
ous functions defined on (and valuated in) Zp could be uniquely represented
as Mahler’s interpolation series (4.2.2). So, it is natural to express condi-
tions of measure-preservation or ergodicity in terms of coefficients of these
series.
Theorem 6.9 ([3, 4, 5]). For p = 2 a function f : Zp → Zp is compatible
and measure-preserving if and only if it could be represented as
f(x) = c0 + x+
∞∑
i=1
ci p
⌊logp i⌋+1
(
x
i
)
(x ∈ Zp);
The function f is compatible and ergodic if and only if it could be represented
as
f(x) = 1 + x+
∞∑
i=1
cip
⌊logp(i+1)⌋+1
(
x
i
)
(x ∈ Zp),
where c0, c1, c2 . . . ∈ Zp. For p 6= 2 these conditions remain sufficient, and
not necessary.
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Thus, in view of theorem 6.9 one can choose a state transition function to
be a polynomial with rational (not necessarily integer) key-dependent coef-
ficients setting ci = 0 for all but finite number of i. Note that to determine
whether a given polynomial f with rational (and not necessarily integer)
coefficients is integer valued (that is, maps Zp into itself), compatible and
ergodic, it is sufficient to determine whether it induces a cycle on O(deg f)
integral points. To be more exact, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6.10 ([5]). A polynomial f(x) with rational, and not neces-
sarily integer coefficients, is integer valued, compatible, and ergodic (resp.,
measure preserving) if and only if
z 7→ f(z) mod p⌊logp(deg f)⌋+3,
where z runs through 0, 1, . . . , p⌊logp(deg f)⌋+3−1, is compatible and transitive
(resp., bijective) mapping of the residue ring Z/p⌊logp(deg f)⌋+3 onto itself.
Theorem 6.9 enables one to use exponentiation in design of generators
that are transitive modulo 2n for all n = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
Example 6.11. For any odd a = 1+ 2m a function f(x) = ax+ ax defines a
transitive modulo 2n generator xi+1 = f(xi) mod 2
n.
Indeed, in view of 6.9 the function f defines a compatible and ergodic
mapping of Z2 onto Z2 since f(x) = (1 + 2m)x + (1 + 2m)
x = x + 2mx +∑∞
i=0m
i2i
(
x
i
)
= 1+ x+4m
(
x
1
)
+
∑∞
i=2m
i2i
(
x
i
)
and i ≥ ⌊log2(i+ 1)⌋+1 for
all i = 2, 3, 4, . . ..
Such a generator could be of practical value since it uses not more than
n+1 multiplications modulo 2n of n-bit numbers; of course, one should use
calls to the table a2
j
mod 2n, j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n − 1. The latter table must
be precomputed, corresponding calculations involve n − 1 multiplications
modulo 2n. Obviously, one can use m as a long-term key, with the initial
state x0 being a short-term key, i.e., one changes m from time to time, but
uses new x0 for each new message. Obviously, without a properly chosen
output function such a generator is not secure. The choice of output function
in more details is discussed further.
Note. A similar argument shows that for every prime p and every a ≡ 1
(mod p) the function f(x) = ax + ax defines a compatible and ergodic
mapping of Zp onto itself.
For polynomials with (rational or p-adic) integer coefficients theorem 6.9
may be restated in the following form.
Proposition 6.12 ([4, 3]). Represent a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z2[x] in a basis
of descending factorial powers
x0 = 1, x1 = x, x2 = x(x− 1), . . . , xi = x(x− 1) · · · (x− i+ 1), . . . ,
i.e., let
f(x) =
d∑
i=0
ci · xi
for c0, c1, . . . , cd ∈ Z2. Then the polynomial f induces an ergodic (and, obvi-
ously, a compatible) mapping of Z2 onto itself iff its coefficients c0, c1, c2, c3
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satisfy the following congruences:
c0 ≡ 1 (mod 2), c1 ≡ 1 (mod 4), c2 ≡ 0 (mod 2), c3 ≡ 0 (mod 4).
The polynomial f induces a measure preserving mapping iff
c1 ≡ 1 (mod 2), c2 ≡ 0 (mod 2), c3 ≡ 0 (mod 2).
Thus, to provide ergodicity of the polynomial mapping f it is necessary
and sufficient to hold fixed 6 bits only, while the other bits of coefficients of f
may vary (e.g., may be key-dependent). This guarantees transitivity of the
state transition function z 7→ f(z) mod 2n for each n, and hence, uniform
distribution of the output sequence.
Proposition 6.12 implies that the polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] is ergodic (resp.,
measure preserving) iff it is transitive modulo 8 (resp., iff it is bijective
modulo 4). A corresponding assertion holds in general case, for arbitrary
prime p.
Theorem 6.13 ([18, 5]). A polynomial f(x) ∈ Zp[x] induces an ergodic
mapping of Zp onto itself iff it is transitive modulo p
2 for p 6= 2, 3, or
modulo p3, for p = 2, 3. The polynomial f(x) ∈ Zp[x] induces a measure
preserving mapping of Zp onto itself iff it is bijective modulo p
2.
Example 6.14. The mapping x 7→ f(x) ≡ x+2x2 (mod 232) (which is used in
RC6, see [22]) is bijective, since it is bijective modulo 4: f(0) ≡ 0 (mod 4),
f(1) ≡ 3 (mod 4), f(2) ≡ 2 (mod 4), f(3) ≡ 1 (mod 4). Thus, the map-
ping x 7→ f(x) ≡ x+ 2x2 (mod 2n) is bijective for all n = 1, 2, . . ..
Hence, with the use of the theorem 6.13 it is possible to obtain transitive
modulo q > 1 mappings for arbitrary natural q: one can just take f(z) =
(1 + z + qˆg(z)) mod q, where g(x) ∈ Z[x] is an arbitrary polynomial, and
qˆ is a product of psp for all prime factors p of q, where s2 = s3 = 3, and
sp = 2 for p 6= 2, 3. Again, the polynomial g(x) may be chosen, roughly
speaking, ‘more or less at random’, i.e., it may be key-dependent, but the
output sequence will be uniformly distributed for any choice of g(x). This
assertion may be generalized either.
Proposition 6.15 ([5]). Let p be a prime, and let g(x) be an arbitrary
composition of arithmetic operations and mappings listed in (4.2.1). Then
the mapping z 7→ 1 + z + p2g(z) (z ∈ Zp) is ergodic.
In fact, both propositions 6.12, 6.15 and theorem 6.13 are special cases of
the following general
Theorem 6.16 ([5]). Let Bp be a class of all functions defined by series
of a form f(x) =
∑∞
i=0 ci · xi, where c0, c1, . . . are p-adic integers, and xi
(i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) are descending factorial powers (see 6.12). Then the function
f ∈ Bp preserves measure iff it is bijective modulo p2; f is ergodic iff it is
transitive modulo p2 (for p 6= 2, 3), or modulo p3 (for p ∈ {2, 3}).
Note. As it was shown in [5], the class Bp contains all polynomial functions
over Zp, as well as analytic (e.g., rational, entire) functions that are conver-
gent everywhere on Zp.
10 As a matter of fact, every mapping that is a com-
position of arithmetic operators (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
10More information about this class could be found in [1]
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operators listed in (4.2.1)) belong to Bp; thus, every such mapping modulo
pn could be induced by a polynomial with rational integer coefficients (see
the end of Section 4 in [5]). For instance, the mapping x 7→ (3x+3x) mod 2n
(which is transitive modulo 2n, see 6.11) could be induced by a polynomial
1+x+4
(x
1
)
+
∑n−1
i=2 2
i
(x
i
)
= 1+5x+
∑n−1
i=2
2i
i! ·xi — just note that ci = 2
i
i! are
2-adic integers since the exponent of maximal power of 2 that is a factor of i!
is exactly i−wt2 i, where wt2 i is a number of 1’s in the base-2 expansion of
i (see e.g. [17, Chapter 1, Section 2, Exercise 12]); thus ‖ci‖2 = 2−wt2 i ≤ 1,
i.e. ci ∈ Z2 and so ci mod 2n ∈ Z.
Theorem 6.16 implies that, for instance, the state transition function
f(z) = (1+z+ζ(q)2(1+ζ(q)u(z))v(z)) mod q is transitive modulo q for each
natural q > 1 and arbitrary polynomials u(x), v(x) ∈ Z[x], where ζ(q) is a
product of all prime factors of q. So the one can choose as a state transition
function not only polynomial functions, but also rational functions, as well
as analytic ones. It should be mentioned, however, that this is merely a
form the function is represented (which could be suitable for some cases
and unsuitable for the others), yet, for a given q, all the functions of this
type may also be represented as polynomials over Z (see [5, Proposition 4.4;
resp., Proposition 4.10 in the preprint]). For instance, certain generators
of inversive kind (i.e., those using taking the inverse modulo 2n) could be
considered in such manner.
Example 6.17. For f(x) = − 12x+1 − x a generator xi+1 = f(xi) mod 2n is
transitive. Indeed, the function f(x) = (−1 + 2x − 4x2 + 8x3 − · · · )− x =
−1+x−4x2+8(· · · ) is analytic and defined everywhere on Z2; thus f ∈ Bp.
Now the conclusion follows in view of 6.16 since by direct calculations it
could be easily verified that the function f(x) ≡ −1 + x − 4x2 (mod 8) is
transitive modulo 8. Note that modulo 2n the mapping x 7→ f(x) mod 2n
could be induced by a polynomial −1+x−4x2+8x3+ · · ·+(−1)n2n−1xn−1.
6.4. Explicit expressions. It turns out that there is an easy way to con-
struct a measure preserving or ergodic mapping out of an arbitrary com-
patible mapping, i.e., out of an arbitrary composition of both arithmetic
(including (4.2.1)) and bitwise logical operators.
Theorem 6.18 ([5]). Let ∆ be a difference operator, i.e., ∆g(x) = g(x +
1) − g(x) by the definition. Let, further, p be a prime, let c be a coprime
with p, gcd(c, p) = 1, and let g : Zp → Zp be a compatible mapping. Then
the mapping z 7→ c + z + p∆g(z) (z ∈ Zp) is ergodic, and the mapping
z 7→ d+ cx+ pg(x), preserves measure for arbitrary d.
Moreover, if p = 2, then the converse also holds: Each compatible and
ergodic (respectively each compatible and measure preserving ) mapping z 7→
f(z) (z ∈ Z2) could be represented as f(x) = 1 + x + 2∆g(x) (respectively
as f(x) = d+ x+ 2g(x)) for suitable d ∈ Z2 and compatible g : Z2 → Z2.
Note. The case p = 2 is the only case the converse of the first assertion of
theorem 6.18 holds.
Proof. To start with, by induction on l we show that g is bijective modulo
pl for all l = 1, 2, 3, . . . . The assumption is obviously true for l = 1.
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Assume it is true for l = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Prove that it holds for l = k
either. Let g(a) ≡ g(b) (mod pk) for some p-adic integers a, b. Then a ≡ b
(mod pk−1) by the induction hypothesis. Hence pv(a) ≡ pv(b) (mod pk)
since v is compatible. Further, the congruence g(a) ≡ g(b) (mod pk) implies
that ca+pv(a) ≡ cb+pv(b) (mod pk), and consequently, ca ≡ cb (mod pk).
Since c 6≡ 0 (mod p), the latter congruence implies that a ≡ b (mod pk),
proving the first assertion of the lemma.
To prove the rest part of the first assertion we note that the just proven
claim implies that h preserves measure. To prove the transitivity of hmodulo
pk for all k = 1, 2, 3, . . . we apply induction on k once again.
It is obvious that h is transitive modulo p. Assume that h is transitive
modulo pk−1. Then, since h induces a permutation on the residue ring
Z/pkZ and since h is a compatible function, we conclude that the length of
each cycle of this permutation must be a multiple of pk−1. Thus, to prove
this permutation is single cycle it suffices to prove that the function
hp
k−1
(x) = h(h . . . (h︸ ︷︷ ︸
pk−1
(x)) . . .)
induces a single cycle permutation on the ideal pk−1Z, generated by the ele-
ment pk−1 of the ring Z/pkZ. In other words, it is sufficient to demonstrate
that the function 1
pk−1
hp
k−1
(pk−1x) is transitive modulo p.
Applying obvious direct calculations, we successively obtain that
h1(x) = c+ x+ pv(x+ 1)− pv(x),
. . . . . . . . .
hj(x) = h(hj−1(x)) = cj + hj−1(x) + pv(hj−1(x) + 1)− pv(hj−1(x)) =
cj + x+ p
j−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x) + 1)− p
j−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x)),
and henceforth. We recall that h0(x) = x by the definition. So,
hp
k−1
(x) = cpk−1 + x+ p
pk−1−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x) + 1)− p
pk−1−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x)). (6.18.1)
Since h is transitive modulo pk−1 and compatible, we get now that
pk−1−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x) + 1) ≡
pk−1−1∑
i=0
v(hi(x)) ≡
pk−1−1∑
z=0
v(z) (mod pk−1),
and (6.18.1) implies then hp
k−1
(x) ≡ cpk−1 + x (mod pk). But c 6≡ 0
(mod p), so we conclude that the function cpk−1 + x induces on the ideal
pk−1Z a single cycle permutation, thus proving the first assertion of the
theorem.
To prove the second assertion, note that as g is compatible, its Mahler’s
interpolation series are of the form of Theorem 4.3; noe note that ∆
(
x
i
)
=( x
i−1
)
and apply Theorem 6.9. 
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Example 6.19. Theorem 6.18 immediately implies Theorem 2 of [15]: For any
composition f of primitive functions, the mapping x 7→ x+2f(x) (mod 2n)
is invertible — just note that a composition of primitive functions is com-
patible (see [15] for the definition of primitive functions). 
Theorem 6.18 is maybe one of the most important tools in design of
pseudorandom generators such that both their state transition functions and
output functions are key-dependent. The corresponding schemes are rather
flexible: In fact, one may use nearly arbitrary composition of arithmetic and
logical operators to produce a strictly uniformly distributed sequence: Both
for g(x) = x XOR(2x+ 1) and for
g(x) =
(
1 + 2
x ANDx2 + x3 ORx4
3 + 4(5 + 6x5)x6 XOR x7
)7+ 8x8
9+10x9
a sequence {xi} defined by recurrence relation xi+1 = (1 + xi + 2(g(xi +
1)− g(xi))) mod 2n is strictly uniformly distributed in Z/2nZ for each n =
1, 2, 3 . . ., i.e., the sequence {xi} is purely periodic with period length exactly
2n, and each element of {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} occurs at the period exactly once.
We will demonstrate further that a designer could vary the function g in
a very wide scope without worsening prescribed values of some important
indicators of security. In fact, choosing the proper arithmetic and bitwise
logical operators the designer is restricted only by desirable performance,
since any compatible ergodic mapping could be produced in this way:
Corollary 6.20. Let p = 2, and let f be a compatible and ergodic mapping of
Z2 onto itself. Then for each n = 1, 2, . . . the state transition function f mod
2n could be represented as a finite composition of arithmetic and bitwise
logical operators.
Proof. In view of proposition 6.18 it is sufficient to prove that for arbitrary
compatible g the function g¯ = g mod 2n could be represented as a finite
composition of operators mentioned in the statement. In view of Definition
2.1,one could represent g¯ as
g¯(x) = γ0(χ0) + 2γ1(χ0, χ1) + · · ·+ 2n−1γn−1(χ0, . . . , χn−1),
where γi = δi(g¯), χi = δi(x), i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Since each γi(χ0, . . . , χi)
is a Boolean function in Boolean variables χ0, . . . , χi, it could be expressed
via finite number of XORs and ANDs of these variables χ0, . . . , χi. Yet each
variable χj could be expressed as χj = δj(x) = x AND(2
j), and the conclusion
follows. 
6.5. Using Boolean representations. As we just have seen, in case p = 2
we have two equivalent descriptions of the class of all compatible ergodic
mappings, namely, theorems 6.9 and 6.18. They enable one to express any
compatible and transitive modulo 2n state transition function either as a
polynomial of special kind over a field Q of rational numbers, or as a spe-
cial composition of arithmetic and bitwise logical operations. Both these
representations are suitable for programming, since they involve only stan-
dard machine instructions. However, we need one more representation, in
a Boolean form, which we have already used in the definition of T -function
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(see Definition 2.1). Despite this representation is not very convenient for
programming, it could be used to prove the ergodicity of some simple map-
pings, see e.g. 6.22 below. The following theorem is just a restatement in our
terms of a known (at least 30 years old) result from the theory of Boolean
functions, the so-called bijectivity/transitivity criterion for triangle Boolean
mappings. However, the latter result is a mathematical folklore, and thus it
is somewhat difficult to attribute it.
Recall that the algebraic normal form, ANF, of the Boolean function
ψj(χ0, . . . , χj) is the representation of this function via ⊕ (addition modulo
2, that is, logical ‘exclusive or’) and · (multiplication modulo 2, that is,
logical ‘and’, or conjunction). In other words, the ANF of the Boolean
function ψ is its representation in the form
ψ(χ0, . . . , χj) = β ⊕ β0χ0 ⊕ β1χ1 ⊕ . . .⊕ β0,1χ0χ1 ⊕ . . . ,
where β, β0, . . . ∈ {0, 1}. The ANF is sometimes called a Boolean polynomial.
Recall that the weight of the Boolean function ψj in (j+1) variables is the
number of (j+1)-bit words that satisfy ψj; that is, weight is the cardinality
of the truth set of ψj .
Theorem 6.21. A mapping T : Z2 → Z2 is compatible and measure pre-
serving iff for each i = 0, 1, . . . the ANF of the Boolean function τTi = δi(T )
in Boolean variables χ0, . . . , χi is
τTi (χ0, . . . , χi) = χi ⊕ ϕTi (χ0, . . . , χi−1),
where ϕTi is an ANF. The mapping T is compatible and ergodic iff, ad-
ditionally, the Boolean function ϕTi is of odd weight, that is, takes value
1 exactly at the odd number of points (ε0, . . . , εi−1), where εj ∈ {0, 1} for
j = 0, 1, . . . , i− 1. The latter takes place if and only if ϕT0 = 1, and the de-
gree of the ANF ϕTi for i ≥ 1 is exactly i, that is, ϕTi contains a monomial
χ0 · · ·χi−1.
Proof. Represent the value of the function T at the 2-adic integer point
x = χ0 + χ1 · 2 + χ2 · 22 + · · · as a 2-adic integer:
T (χ0 + χ1 · 2 + χ2 · 22 + · · · ) =
∞∑
i=0
δi(x) · 2i.
The function T is compatible (that is, a T -function) if and only if δi(x)
does not depend on χi+1, χi+2, . . . for every i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., see Definition 2.1.
Thus, each δi(x) is a Boolean function τ
T
i in Boolean variables χ0, χ1, . . . , χi.
Re-write the ANF of the function τTi in the following form:
τTi (χ0, . . . , χi) = χi · ψTi (χ0, . . . , χi−1)⊕ ϕTi (χ0, . . . , χi−1),
where both ψTi (χ0, . . . , χi−1) and ϕ
T
i (χ0, . . . , χi−1) are Boolean functions in
Boolean variables χ0, . . . , χi−1.
Obviously, whenever all ψTi (χ0, . . . , χi−1) are identically 1, the function is
measure-preserving since it is bijective modulo 2k+1 for each k = 0, 1, 2, . . .:
To find a co-image of the mapping T mod 2k one must solve a system of
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Boolean equations 

χ0 + ϕ
T
0 = α0,
χ1 + ϕ
T
1 (χ1) = α1,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
χk + ϕ
T
k (χ0, . . . , χk−1) = αk,
which has a unique solution given any α0, . . . , αk ∈ {0, 1}.
Conversely, in let i be the smallest number such that ψi(χ0, . . . , χi−1) = 0
for a certain set χ0, . . . , χi−1 of zeros and ones. Then
T (χ0+χ1·2+· · ·χ2·2i−1+0·2i) ≡ T (χ0+χ1·2+· · ·χ2·2i−1+1·2i) (mod 2i+1).
Thus, T can not be measure-preserving in view of Theorem 5.2.
Further, to prove the ergodicity part of the statement we note that T is
transitive modulo 2 if and only if τT0 (χ0) = χ0 ⊕ 1. In case T is transitive
modulo 2k,
δi(T
2k)(x) =
{
χi, if i < k;
χk ⊕ σ, if i = k,
where σ is a sum modulo 2 of all values of the Boolean function ϕTk at all
points of Bk; that is, σ is the weight modulo 2 of the function ϕTk . Clearly, to
provide transitivity of the function T modulo 2k+1, (cf. Theorem 5.2 must
be σ = 1. That is, weight of the function ϕTk must be odd.
The rest of the statement of the theorem is a well-known result in the
theory of Boolean functions; the proof is left to a reader. 
Note. The bit-slice techniques of Klimov and Shamir, which they introduced
in 2002 in [15] is just a re-statement of the above stated folklore theorem
6.21.
This is how Theorem 6.21 works:
Example 6.22. With the use of 6.21 it is possible to give another proof of the
main result of [15], namely, of Theorem 3: The mapping f(x) = x+(x2∨C)
over n-bit words is invertible if and only if the least significant bit of C is 1.
For n ≥ 3 it is a permutation with a single cycle if and only if both the least
significant bit and the third least significant bit of C are 1.
Proof of theorem 3 of [15]. Recall that for x ∈ Z2 and i = 0, 1, 2, . . . we
denote χi = δi(x) ∈ {0, 1}; also we denote ci = δi(C). We will calculate
δi(x+(x
2∨C)) as an ANF in Boolean variables χ0, χ1, . . . and we start with
the following easy claims:
• δ0(x2) = χ0, δ1(x2) = 0, δ2(x2) = χ0χ1 ⊕ χ1,
• δn(x2) = χn−1χ0 ⊕ ψn(χ0, . . . , χn−2) for all n ≥ 3, where ψn is a
Boolean function in n− 1 Boolean variables χ0, . . . , χn−2.
The first of these claims could be easily verified by direct calculations.
To prove the second one represent x = x¯n−1 + 2
n−1sn−1 (where we recall
x¯n−1 = x mod 2
n−1) and calculate x2 = (x¯n−1 + 2
n−1sn−1)
2 = x¯2n−1 +
2nsn−1x¯n−1+2
2n−2s2n−1 = x¯
2
n−1+2
nχn−1χ0 (mod 2
n+1) for n ≥ 3 and note
that x¯2n−1 depends only on χ0, . . . , χn−2.
This gives
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(1) δ0(x
2 ∨ C) = χ0 ⊕ c0 ⊕ χ0c0
(2) δ1(x
2 ∨ C) = c1
(3) δ2(x
2 ∨ C) = χ0χ1 ⊕ χ1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c2χ1 ⊕ c2χ0χ1
(4) δn(x
2 ∨ C) = χn−1χ0 ⊕ ψn ⊕ cn ⊕ cnχn−1χ0 ⊕ cnψn for n ≥ 3
From here it follows that if n ≥ 3, then δn(x2 ∨C) = λn(χ0, . . . , χn−1), and
deg λn ≤ n− 1, since ψn depends only on, may be, χ0, . . . , χn−2.
Now successively calculate γn = δn(x + (x
2 ∨ C)) for n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We
have δ0(x + (x
2 ∨ C)) = c0 ⊕ χ0c0 so necessarily c0 = 1 since otherwise
f is not bijective modulo 2. Proceeding further with c0 = 1 we obtain
δ1(x + (x
2 ∨ C)) = c1 ⊕ χ0 ⊕ χ1, since χ1 is a carry. Then δ2(x + (x2 ∨
C)) = (c1χ0 ⊕ c1χ1 ⊕ χ0χ1) ⊕ (χ0χ1 ⊕ χ1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c2χ1 ⊕ c2χ0χ1) ⊕ χ2 =
c1χ0 ⊕ c1χ1 ⊕ χ1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c2χ1 ⊕ c2χ0χ1 ⊕ χ2, here c1χ0 ⊕ c1χ1 ⊕ χ0χ1 is a
carry. From here in view of 6.21 we immediately have c2 = 1 since otherwise
f is not transitive modulo 8. Now for n ≥ 3 one has γn = αn + λn ⊕ χn,
where αn is a carry, and αn+1 = αnλn ⊕ αnχn ⊕ λnχn. But if c2 = 1
then degα3 = deg(µν ⊕ χ2µ ⊕ χ2ν) = 3, where µ = c1χ0 ⊕ c1χ1 ⊕ χ0χ1,
ν = (χ0χ1⊕χ1⊕c2⊕c2χ1⊕c2χ0χ1) = 0. This implies inductively in view of
(4) above that degαn+1 = n+ 1 and that γn+1 = χn+1 ⊕ ξn+1(χ0, . . . , χn),
deg ξn+1 = n + 1. So the conditions of 6.21 are satisfied, thus finishing the
proof of theorem 3 of [15]. 
There are some more applications of Theorem 6.21.
Proposition 6.23. Let F : Zn+12 → Z2 be a compatible mapping such that
for all z1, . . . , zn ∈ Z2 the mapping F (x, z1, . . . , zn) : Z2 → Z2 is mea-
sure preserving. Then F (f(x), 2g1(x), . . . , 2gn(x)) preserves measure for all
compatible g1, . . . , gn : Z2 → Z2 and all compatible and measure preserving
f : Z2 → Z2. Moreover, if f is ergodic then f(x + 4g(x)), f(x ⊕ (4g(x))),
f(x)+ 4g(x), and f(x)⊕ (4g(x)) are ergodic for any compatible g : Z2 → Z2
(here ⊕ stands for XOR).
Proof. Try to prove this yourself! 
Example 6.24. With the use of 6.23 it is possible to construct very fast
generators xi+1 = f(xi) mod 2
n that are transitive modulo 2n. For instance,
take
f(x) = (. . . ((((x+ c0)⊕ d0) + c1)⊕ d1) + · · ·+ cm)⊕ dm,
where c0 ≡ 1 (mod 2), and the rest of ci, di are 0 modulo 4. By the way,
this generator, looking somewhat ‘linear’, is as a rule rather ‘nonlinear’: the
corresponding polynomial over Q is of high degree. The general case of these
functions f (for arbitrary ci, di) was studied by the author’s student Ludmila
Kotomina: She proved that such a function is ergodic iff it is transitive
modulo 4.
Yet another application of Theorem 6.21 are multivariate single cycle
T -functions. We already know that there are no such functions among uni-
formly differentiable modulo 2 functions, see Theorem 6.3. However, the
non-differentiable modulo 2 multivariate ergodic functions on Z2 exist.
In 2004 Klimov and Shamir introduced a multivariate T -function H with
a single cycle property. The m-variate mapping
H : (−→x 0,−→x 1, . . . ,−→x m−1) 7→ (h0, h1, . . . , hm−1)
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over n-bit words −→x 0,−→x 1, . . . ,−→x m−1, defined by
hs =
−→x s ⊕ ((h(−→x 0 ∧ · · · ∧ −→x m−1)⊕
(−→x 0 ∧ · · · ∧ −→x m−1)) ∧ −→x 0 ∧ · · · ∧ −→x s−1,
s = 0, 1, . . . ,m−1, has a single cycle property whenever h is a univariate T -
function with a single cycle property. Here ∧ stands for AND, bitwise logical
‘and’ (a conjunction). We assume that a bitwise conjunction over an empty
set of indices is a string of all 1’s.
Actually, this is just a trick: The m-variate mapping H on n-bit words is
a multivariate representation of a univariate T -function over mn-bit words.
Indeed, given a univariate T -function F ,
x = (. . . , χ2, χ1, χ0)
F7→ (. . . ;ψ2(χ0, χ1, χ2);ψ1(χ0, χ1);ψ0(χ0)),
arrange this mapping in columns of height m, this way:
. . . χ2m χm χ0
f07→ . . . ψ2m(x) ψm(x) ψ0(x)
. . . χ2m+1 χm+1 χ1
f17→ . . . ψ2m+1(x) ψm+1(x) ψ1(x)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . χ3m−1 χ2m−1 χm−1
fm−17→ . . . ψ3m−1(x) ψ2m−1(x) ψm−1(x)
Now just assume the left-hand rows are new variables:
−→x j = (. . . , χ2m+j , χm+j , χj), (j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1).
Obviously, the m-variate mapping F = (f0, f1, . . . , fm−1) has a single cycle
property iff a univariate mapping F has a single property.
Consider the simplest example: F (x) = 1 + x. We have
δj(F (x)) ≡ δj(x) +
j−1∏
s=0
δs(x) (mod 2)
(we assume the product over the empty set is 1); then the m-variate repre-
sentation F = (f0, f1, . . . , fm−1) of this mapping is
fk(
−→x 0, . . . ,−→x m−1) = −→x k ⊕
(( k−1∧
s=0
−→x s
)
∧
(m−1∧
r=0
((−→x r + 1)⊕−→x r)
))
=
−→x k ⊕
(( k−1∧
s=0
−→x s
)
∧
(((m−1∧
r=0
−→x r
)
+ 1
)
⊕
(m−1∧
r=0
−→x r
)))
.
With the use of this trick and with Theorem 6.21 the following multivari-
ate ergodic T -functions could be constructed:
Proposition 6.25 ([7]). Let t, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, let all f (t)j (resp., g(t)j )
be univariate ergodic (resp, measure-preserving) compatible mappings from
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Z2 onto Z2. Then the mapping F(x) = (f0(x), . . . , fm−1(x))
f0(x) =
−→x 0 ⊞
(m−1∧
r=0
(f
(r)
0 (
−→x r)⊕−→x r)
)
;
f1(x) =
−→x 1 ⊞
(
g
(0)
1 (
−→x 0) ∧
(m−1∧
r=0
(f
(r)
1 (
−→x r)⊕−→x r)
))
;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
fm−1(x) =
−→x m−1 ⊞
((m−2∧
t=0
g
(t)
m−1(
−→x t)
)
∧
(m−1∧
r=0
(f
(r)
m−1(
−→x r)⊕−→x r)
))
,
where x = (−→x 0, . . . ,−→x m−1), ⊞ ∈ {+,⊕}, is a compatible and ergodic map-
ping of Zm2 onto Z
m
2 .
7. Wreath products of PRNGs
In the preceding section we have developed some tools that enable us
to construct algorithms based on standard instructions of an n-bit word
processor that produce strictly uniformly distributed sequences of period
length 2n.
To judge whether these sequences could be of use for stream encryption
we must study their properties that are crucial for stream ciphers. One
of these properties is long period. But is the period of are sequences long
enough? Not yet! In case n = 32, which is a standard for most contemporary
processors, we obtain a period of length 232, which is too small to satisfy
contemporary safety conditions: At least some 280 is needed. Thus, we must
make the period longer leaving the sequence uniformly distributed. In this
section we consider corresponding techniques.
7.1. What is wreath product. We start with a formal definition:
Definition 7.1. Given a mapping U : Z → Z, and a set of mappings V =
{(Vz : X → X) : z ∈ Z}, a wreath product (or, a skew product or, a skew
shift) is a mapping
U ⋌ V : (z, x) 7→ (U(z), Vz(x))
of the Cartesian product Z ×X into itself.
In other words, the wreath product is a bivariate mapping where the first
coordinate is a function of the variable z only, and the second coordinate is
a bivariate function of z and x.
Most probably, you are already familiar with examples of wreath products;
recall Feistel network: The mapping it is based on is (z, x) 7→ (z, z ⊕ f(x)),
where z, x ∈ Bn, f : Bn → Bn, which is obviously a wreath product of
U(z) = z with V = {Vz(x) = z ⊕ f(x) : z ∈ Bn}.
Obviously, the wreath product U ⋌ V is bijective whenever
both U and all Vz are bijective.
Some terminology notes: In automata theory (and in algebra) they used
to speak of wreath products, whereas in dynamical systems (and in ergodic
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theory) theory they prefer the term skew product, or skew shift. Recall that
ordinary PRNG corresponds to an autonomous dynamical system.
This is a non-autonomous dynamical system, which is a counterpart of a
counter-dependent PRNG 2.0.1 in dynamics: A non-autonomous dynamical
system is a dynamical system driven by another dynamical system, and skew
products are used to combine two dynamical systems into a new one.
Note that a T -function is a composition of wreath products: Let F be a
T -function,
(χ0, χ1, χ2, . . .)
F7→ (ψ0(χ0);ψ1(χ0, χ1);ψ2(χ0, χ1, χ2); . . .),
then
χ0 7→ ψ0(χ0)
(χ0, χ1) 7→ (ψ0(χ0), ψ1(χ0, χ1))
((χ0, χ1), χ2) 7→ ((ψ0(χ0), ψ1(χ0, χ1)), ψ2(χ0, χ1, χ2))
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Now we re-state the above definition for the case of wreath products of
automata:
Definition 7.2. Let Aj = 〈N,M, fj , Fj〉 be a family of automata with the
same state set N and the same output alphabet M indexed by elements
of a non-empty (possibly, countably infinite) set J (members of the family
need not be necessarily pairwise distinct). Let T : J → J be an arbitrary
mapping. A wreath product of the family {Aj} of automata with respect to
the mapping T is an automaton with the state set N × J , state transition
function f˘(j, z) = (fj(z), T (j)) and output function F˘ (j, z) = Fj(z). We
call fj (resp., Fj) clock state update (resp., output) functions.
Obviously, the state transition function f˘(j, z) = (fj(z), T (j)) is a wreath
product of a family of mappings {fj : j ∈ J} with respect to the mapping T
It worth notice here that if J = N0 and Fi does not depend on i, this con-
struction gives us a number of examples of counter-dependent generators in
the sense of [23, Definition 2.4], where the notion of a counter-dependent gen-
erator was originally introduced. However, we use this notion in a broader
sense in comparison with that of [23]: In our counter-dependent generators
not only the state transition function, but also the output function depends
on i. Moreover, in [23] only a special case of counter-dependent genera-
tors is studied; namely, counter-assisted generators and their cascaded and
two-step modifications. A state transition function of a counter-assisted
generator is of the form fi(x) = i ⋆ h(x), where ⋆ is a binary quasigroup
operation (in particular, group operation, e.g., + or XOR), and h(x) does not
depend on i. An output function of a counter-assisted generator does not
depend on i either.
7.2. Constructions. In this subsection we introduce a method to construct
counter dependent pseudorandom generators out of ergodic and measure-
preserving mappings. The method guarantees that output sequences of these
generators are always strictly uniformly distributed. Actually, all these con-
structions are wreath products of automata in the sense of 7.2; the following
results give us conditions these automata should satisfy to produce a uni-
formly distributed output sequence. Our main technical tool is the following
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theorem, which actually could be considered as a generalization of Theorem
6.21:
Theorem 7.3 ([6]). Let G = g0, . . . , gm−1 be a finite sequence of compatible
measure preserving mappings of Z2 onto itself such that
(1) the sequence {(gi mod m(0)) mod 2: i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is purely periodic,
its shortest period is of length m;
(2)
∑m−1
i=0 gi(0) ≡ 1 (mod 2);
(3)
∑m−1
j=0
∑2k−1
z=0 gj(z) ≡ 2k (mod 2k+1) for all k = 1, 2, . . . .
Then the recurrence sequence Z defined by the relation xi+1 = gi mod m(xi)
is strictly uniformly distributed modulo 2n for all n = 1, 2, . . . : That is,
modulo each 2n the sequence Z is purely periodic, its shortest period is of
length 2nm, and each element of Z/2nZ occurs at the period exactly m times.
Note. In view of 6.21 condition (3) of theorem 7.3 could be replaced by the
equivalent condition
m−1∑
j=0
Coef0,...,k−1(ϕ
j
k) ≡ 1 (mod 2) (k = 1, 2, . . .),
where Coef0,...,k−1(ϕ) is a coefficient of the monomial χ0 · · ·χk−1 in ANF ϕ.
It turns out that the sequence Z of 7.3 is just the sequence Y of the
following
Lemma 7.4 ([6]). Let c0, . . . , cm−1 be a finite sequence of 2-adic integers,
and let g0, . . . , gm−1 be a finite sequence of compatible mappings of Z2 onto
itself such that
(i) gj(x) ≡ x+ cj (mod 2) for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1,
(ii)
∑m−1
j=0 cj ≡ 1 (mod 2),
(iii) the sequence {ci mod m mod 2: i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is purely periodic, its
shortest period is of length m,
(iv) δk(gj(z)) ≡ ζk + ϕjk(ζ0, . . . , ζk−1) (mod 2), k = 1, 2, . . ., where ζr =
δr(z), r = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
(v) for each k = 1, 2, . . . an odd number of ANFs ϕjk in Boolean variables
ζ0, . . . , ζk−1 are of odd weight.
Then the recurrence sequence Y = {xi ∈ Z2} defined by the relation xi+1 =
gi mod m(xi) is strictly uniformly distributed: It is purely periodic modulo 2
k
for all k = 1, 2, . . .; its shortest period is of length 2km; each element of
Z/2kZ occurs at the period exactly m times. Moreover,
(1) the sequence Ds = {δs(xi) : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is purely periodic; it has
a period of length 2s+1m,
(2) δs(xi+2sm) ≡ δs(xi) + 1 (mod 2) for all s = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, i =
0, 1, 2, . . .,
(3) for each t = 1, 2, . . . , k and each r = 0, 1, 2, . . . the sequence
xr mod 2
t, xr+m mod 2
t, xr+2m mod 2
t, . . .
is purely periodic, its shortest period is of length 2t, each element of
Z/2tZ occurs at the period exactly once.
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Note 7.5. Assuming m = 1 in 7.3 one obtains ergodicity criterion 6.21.
Corollary 7.6 ([6]). Let a finite sequence of mappings {g0, . . . , gm−1} of Z2
into itself satisfy conditions of theorem 7.3, and let {F0, . . . , Fm−1} be an
arbitrary finite sequence of balanced (and not necessarily compatible) map-
pings of Z/2nZ (n ≥ 1) onto Z/2kZ, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then the sequence
F = {Fi mod m(xi) : i = 0, 1, 2 . . .}, where xi+1 = gi mod m(xi) mod 2n, is
strictly uniformly distributed over Z/2kZ: It is purely periodic with a pe-
riod of length 2nm, and each element of Z/2kZ occurs at the period exactly
2n−km times.
Theorem 7.3 and lemma 7.4 together with corollary 7.6 enables one to
construct a counter-dependent generator out of the following components:
• A sequence c0, . . . , cm−1 of integers, which we call a control sequence.
• A sequence h0, . . . , hm−1 of compatible mappings, which is used to
form a sequence of clock state update functions gi
• A sequence H0, . . . ,Hm−1 of compatible mappings to produce clock
output functions Fi
Note that ergodic functions that are needed could be produced out of com-
patible ones with the use of 6.18 or 6.23. A control sequence could be
produced by an external generator (which in turn could be a generator of
the kind considered in this course), or it could be just a queue the state
update and output functions are called from a look-up table. The functions
hi and/or Hi could be either precomputed to arrange that look-up table, or
they could be produced on-the-fly in a form that is determined by a control
sequence. This form may also look ‘crazy’, e.g.,
hi(x) = (· · · ((u0(δ0(ci))©δ1(ci),δ2(ci) u1(δ3(ci)))©δ4(ci),δ5(ci) u2(δ6(ci))) · · · ,
(7.6.1)
where uj(0) = x, the variable, and uj(1) is a constant (which is determined
by ci, or is read from a precomputed look-up table, etc.), while (say)©0,0 =
+, an integer addition, ©1,0 = ·, an integer multiplication, ©0,1 = XOR,
©1,1 = AND. This is absolutely no matter what these hi and Hi look like
or how they are obtained, the above stated results give a general method
to combine all the data together to produce a uniformly distributed output
sequence of a maximum period length.
Examples 7.7 ([6]). A basic circuit illustrating these example wreath prod-
ucts is given at Figure 3.
(1) Let c0, . . . , cm−1 be an arbitrary sequence of length m = 2
s , and
let hˆ0, . . . , hˆm−1 be arbitrary compatible mappings. For 0 ≤ j ≤
m − 1 put hj(x) = 1 + x + 4 · hˆj(x) and let gj(x) = cj + hj(x).
These mappings gj satisfy conditions of theorem 7.3 if and only if∑2m−1
j=0 cj ≡ 1 (mod 2).
(2) For m > 1 odd let {h0, . . . , hm−1} be a finite sequence of compat-
ible and ergodic mappings; let c0, . . . , cm−1 be a finite sequence of
integers such that
• ∑m−1j=0 cj ≡ 0 (mod 2), and
• the sequence {ci mod m mod 2: i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is purely periodic
with the shortest period of length m.
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xi
hyi
W
U
+
Z
xi+1 = ci + hyi(xi)
ci =W (yi)yi+1 = U(yi)
yi
Figure 3. Wreath product basic circuit for Examples 7.7.
Put gj(x) = cj ⊕ hj(x) (respectively, gj(x) = cj + hj(x)). Then gj
satisfy conditions of 7.3.
(3) The conditions of (2) are satisfied in casem = 2s−1 and c0, . . . , cm−1
is the output sequence of a maximum period linear feedback shift
register over Z/2Z with s cells.
8. Properties of output sequences
In this section we study a structure and statistical properties of output
sequences of wreath products of automata, that is, sequences described by
Theorem 7.3. Note that in view of 7.5, all the results of this section remain
true for compatible mappings T : Z2 → Z2 (i.e., for T-functions) either.
8.1. Distribution of k-tuples. The output sequence Z of any wreath
product of automata that satisfy 7.3 is strictly uniformly distributed as
a sequence over Z/2nZ for all n. That is, each sequence Zn of residues
modulo 2n of terms of the sequence Z is purely periodic, and each element
of Z/2nZ occurs at the period the same number of times. However, when
this sequence Zn is used as a key-stream, that is, as a binary sequence Z ′n
obtained by a concatenation of successive n-bit words of Z, it is important
to know how n-tuples are distributed in this binary sequence. Yet strict
uniform distribution of an arbitrary sequence T as a sequence over Z/2nZ
does not necessarily imply uniform distribution of n-tuples, if this sequence
is considered as a binary sequence T ′.
For instance, let T = 0132013201321 . . .. This sequence is strictly uni-
formly distributed over Z/4Z; the length of its shortest period is 4. Its
binary representation is T ′2 = 000111100001111000011110 . . . Considering T
as a sequence over Z/4Z, each number of {0, 1, 2, 3} occurs in the sequence
with the same frequency 14 . Yet if we consider T in its binary form T ′2 , then
00 (as well as 11) occurs in this sequence with frequency 38 , whereas 01 (as
well as 10) occurs with frequency 18 .
In this subsection we show that such an effect does not take place for
output sequences of automata described in 7.3, 7.4, and 7.7: Considering
any of these sequences in a binary form, a distribution of k-tuples is uniform,
for all k ≤ n. Now we state this property formally.
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Consider a (binary) n-cycle C = (ε0ε1 . . . εn−1), i.e., an oriented graph on
vertices {a0, a1, . . . , an−1} and edges
{(a0, a1), (a1, a2), . . . , (an−2, an−1), (an−1, a0)},
where each vertex aj is labelled with εj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. (Note
that then (ε0ε1 . . . εn−1) = (εn−1ε0 . . . εn−2) = . . ., etc.). Clearly, each purely
periodic sequence S over Z/2Z with period α0 . . . αn−1 of length n could be
related to a binary n-cycle C(S) = (α0 . . . αn−1). Conversely, to each binary
n-cycle (α0 . . . αn−1) we could relate n purely periodic binary sequences with
periods of length n: Those are n shifted versions of the sequence
α0 . . . αn−1α0 . . . αn−1 . . . .
Further, a k-chain in a binary n-cycle C is a binary string β0 . . . βk−1,
k < n, that satisfies the following condition: There exists j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}
such that βi = ε(i+j) mod n for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. Thus, a k-chain is just a
string of length k of labels that corresponds to a chain of length k in a graph
C. We call a binary n-cycle C k-full, if each k-chain occurs in the graph C
the same number r > 0 of times.
Clearly, if C is k-full, then n = 2kr. For instance, a well-known De Bruijn
sequence is an n-full 2n-cycle. Clearly enough that a k-full n-cycle is (k−1)-
full: Each (k−1)-chain occurs in C exactly 2r times, etc. Thus, if an n-cycle
C(S) is k-full, then each m-tuple (where 1 ≤ m ≤ k) occurs in the sequence
S with the same probability (limit frequency) 12m . That is, the sequence S
is k-distributed, see [16, Section 3.5, Definition D].
Definition 8.1. A purely periodic binary sequence S with the shortest
period of length N is said to be strictly k-distributed iff the corresponding
N -cycle C(S) is k-full.
Thus, if a sequence S is strictly k-distributed, then it is strictly s-distributed,
for all positive s ≤ k.
Theorem 8.2 ([6]). For the sequence Z of theorem 7.3 each binary sequence
Z ′n is strictly k-distributed for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note 8.3. Theorem 8.2 remains true for the sequence F of corollary 7.6,
where Fj(x) =
⌊
x
2n−k
⌋
mod 2k, j = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, a truncation of (n − k)
less significant bits. Namely, a binary representation F ′n of the sequence F
is a purely periodic strictly k-distributed binary sequence with a period of
length 2nmk.
Theorem 8.2 treats an output sequence of a counter-dependent automaton
as an infinite (though, a periodic) binary sequence. However, in cryptog-
raphy only a part of a period is used during encryption. So it is natural
to ask how ‘random’ is a finite segment (namely, the period) of this infi-
nite sequence. According to [16, Section 3.5, Definition Q1] a finite binary
sequence ε0ε1 . . . εN−1 of length N is said to be random, iff∣∣∣∣ν(β0 . . . βk−1)N − 12k
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1√N (8.3.1)
for all 0 < k ≤ log2N , where ν(β0 . . . βk−1) is the number of occurrences of
a binary word β0 . . . βk−1 in a binary word ε0ε1 . . . εN−1. If a finite sequence
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is random in the sense of this Definition Q1 of [16], we shall say that this
sequence satisfies Q1. We shall also say that an infinite periodic sequence
satisfy Q1 iff its shortest period satisfies Q1. Note that, contrasting to
the case of strict k-distribution, which implies strict (k − 1)-distribution, it
is not enough to demonstrate only that (8.3.1) holds for k = ⌊log2N⌋ to
prove a finite sequence of length N satisfies Q1: For instance, the sequence
1111111100000111 satisfies (8.3.1) for k = ⌊log2N⌋ = 4 and does not satisfy
(8.3.1) for k = 3.
Corollary 8.4 ([6]). The sequence Z ′n of theorem 8.2 satisfies Q1 if m ≤ 2
n
n .
Moreover, in this case under the conditions of 8.3 the output binary sequence
still satisfies Q1 if one truncates 0 ≤ k ≤ n2 − log2 n2 lower order bits (that
is, if one uses clock output functions Fj of 8.3).
We note here that according to 8.4 a control sequence of a counter-
dependent automaton (see 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, and the text and examples there-
after) may not satisfy Q1 at all, yet nevertheless a corresponding output
sequence necessarily satisfies Q1. Thus, with the use of wreath product
techniques one could stretch ‘non-randomly looking’ sequences to ‘randomly
looking’ ones.
8.2. Structure. A recurrence sequence could be ‘very uniformly distributed’,
yet nevertheless could have some mathematical structure that might be used
by an attacker to break the cipher. For instance, a clock sequence xi = i
is uniformly distributed in Z2. We are going to study what structure could
have sequences outputted by our counter-dependent generators.
Theorem 7.3 immediately implies that the jth coordinate sequence δj(Z) =
{δj(xi) : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} (j = 0, 1, 2, . . .) of the sequence Z, i.e., a sequence
formed by all jth bits of terms of the sequence Z, has a period not longer
than m · 2j+1. Moreover, the following could be easily proved:
Proposition 8.5 ([6]). (1) The jth coordinate sequence δj(Z) is a purely
periodic binary sequence with a period of length 2j+1m, and (2) the second
half of the period is a bitwise negation of the first half: δj(xi+2jm) ≡ δj(xi)+1
(mod 2), i = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Note. The jth coordinate sequence of a sequence generated by a single-cycle
T -function is purely periodic, and 2j+1 is the length of the shortest period
of this sequence. The second half of the period is a bitwise negation of the
first half, i.e., ζi+2j ≡ ζi + 1 (mod 2) for each i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Proposition 8.5 means that the jth coordinate sequence of the sequence
of states of a counter-dependent generator is completely determined by the
first half of its period; so, intuitively, it is as ‘complex’ as the first half of its
period. Thus we ought to understand what sequences of length 2jm occur
as the first half of the period of the jth coordinate sequence.
For j = 0 (and m > 1) the answer immediately follows from 7.3 and 7.4
— any binary sequence c0, . . . , cm−1 such that
∑m−1
j=0 cj ≡ 1 (mod 2) does.
It turns out that for j > 0 any binary sequence could be produced as the
first half of the period of the jth coordinate sequence independently of other
coordinate sequences.
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More formally, to each sequence Z described by theorem 7.3 we associate
a sequence Γ(Z) = {γ1, γ2, . . .} of non-negative rational integers γj ∈ N0 =
{0, 1, 2, . . .} such that 0 ≤ γj ≤ 22jm − 1 and the base-2 expansion of γj
agrees with the first half of the period of the jth coordinate sequence δj(Z)
for all j = 1, 2, . . .; that is
γj = δj(x0) + 2 · δj(x1) + 4 · δj(x2) + · · ·+ 22jm−1 · δj(x2jm−1),
where x0 is an initial state; xi+1 = gi mod m(xi), i = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Now we take
an arbitrary sequence Γ(Z) = {γ1, γ2, . . .} of non-negative rational integers
γj such that 0 ≤ γj ≤ 22jm − 1 and wonder whether this sequence could be
so associated to some sequence Z described by theorem 7.3.
The answer is yes. Namely, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 8.6 ([6]). Letm > 1 be a rational integer, and let Γ = {γ1, γ2, . . . }
be an arbitrary sequence over N0 such that γj ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 22jm − 1} for
all j = 1, 2, . . . . Then there exist a finite sequence G = {g0, . . . , gm−1}
of compatible measure preserving mappings of Z2 onto itself and a 2-adic
integer x0 = z ∈ Z2 such that G satisfies conditions of theorem 7.3, and the
base-2 expansion of γj agrees with the first 2
jm terms of the sequence δj(Z)
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , where the recurrence sequence Z = {x0, x1, . . . ∈ Z2}
is defined by the recurrence relation xi+1 = gi mod m(xi), (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ).
In case m = 1 the assertion holds for an arbitrary Γ = {γ0, γ1, . . . }, where
γj ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 22j − 1}, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. We will prove the theorem only for m = 1 (i.e., for T -functions) by
two reasons. First, in this case use of methods of 2-adic analysis becomes
more transparent, and second, the proof for m > 1 is much more technical
and complicated (an interested reader is referred to [6]).
Speaking informally, we fill a table with countable infinite number of
rows and columns in such a way that the first 2j entries of the jth column
represent γj in its base-2 expansion, and the other entries of this column
are obtained from these by applying recursive relation of Proposition 8.5;
that is, the next 2j entries are bitwise negation of the first 2j entries, the
third 2j entries are bitwise negation of the second 2j entries, etc. Then we
read each ith row of the table as a 2-adic canonical representation of 2-adic
integer which we denote via zi. Thus we define a set Z = {z0, z1, . . .} of
2-adic integers.
We shall prove that Z is a dense subset in Z2, and then define f on Z
in such a way that f is compatible and ergodic on Z. This will imply the
assertion of the theorem.
Proceeding along this way we claim that Z mod 2k = Z/2kZ for all k =
1, 2, 3, . . ., i.e., a natural ring homomorphism mod 2k : z 7→ z mod 2k maps
Z onto the residue ring Z/2kZ. Indeed, this trivially holds for k = 1.
Assuming our claim holds for k < m we prove it for k = m. Given arbitrary
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2m−1} there exists zi ∈ Z such that zi ≡ t (mod 2m−1). If zi 6≡
t (mod 2m) then δm−1(zi) ≡ δm−1(t)+1 (mod 2) and thus δm−1(zi+2m−1) ≡
δm−1(t) (mod 2). However, zi+2m−1 ≡ zi (mod 2m−1). Hence zi+2m−1 ≡ t
(mod 2m).
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A similar argument shows that for each k ∈ N the sequence {zi mod
2k : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is purely periodic with period length 2k, and each t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2k−1} occurs at the period exactly once (in particular, all elements
of Z are pairwise distinct 2-adic integers). Moreover, i ≡ i′ (mod 2k) iff
zi ≡ zi′ (mod 2k). Consequently, Z is dense in Z2 since for each t ∈ Z2
and each k ∈ N there exists zi ∈ Z such that ‖zi − t‖2 ≤ 2−k. Moreover,
if we define f(zi) = zi+1 for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . then ‖f(zi) − f(zi′)‖2 =
‖zi+1 − zi′+1‖2 = ‖(i + 1) − (i′ + 1)‖2 = ‖i − i′‖2 = ‖zi − zi′‖2. Hence, f
is well defined and compatible on Z; it follows that the continuation of f
to the whole space Z2 is compatible. Yet f is transitive modulo 2
k for each
k ∈ N, so its continuation is ergodic. 
Note 8.7 (Representation by T-functions). Supposem = 2k under conditions
of Theorem 8.6. Then, considering the sequence δj(Z), one deals with the
(j +m)-th coordinate sequence of a single-cycle T-function.
8.3. Linear complexity. The latter is an important cryptographic mea-
sure of complexity of a binary sequence; being a number of cells of the
shortest linear feedback shift register (LFSR) that outputs the given se-
quence11 it estimates dimensions of a linear system an attacker must solve
to obtain initial state.
Theorem 8.8 ([6]). For Z and m of theorem 7.3 let Zj = δj(Z), j > 0,
be the jth coordinate sequence. Represent m = 2kr, where r is odd. Then
length of the shortest period of Zj is 2k+j+1s for some s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, and
both extreme cases s = 1 and s = r occur: For every sequence s1, s2, . . . over
a set {1, r} there exists a sequence Z of theorem 7.3 such that length of the
shortest period of Zj is 2k+j+1sj, (j = 1, 2, . . .). Moreover, linear complexity
λ2(Zj) of the sequence Zj satisfies the following inequality:
2k+j + 1 ≤ λ2(Zj) ≤ 2k+jr + 1.
Both these bounds are sharp: For every sequence t1, t2, . . . over a set {1, r}
there exists a sequence Z of theorem 7.3 such that linear complexity of Zj
is exactly 2k+jtj + 1, (j = 1, 2, . . .).
Note. The linear complexity of the j-th coordinate sequence of a T -function
is exactly 2j + 1, i.e., approximately half of the length of the period of the
sequence. Note that the expectation of the linear complexity λ2(C) of a
random sequence C of length L is L2 .
Whereas the linear complexity of a binary sequence X is the length of the
shortest LFSR that produces X , the ℓ-error linear complexity is the length
of the shortest LFSR that produces a sequence with almost the same (with
the exception of not more than ℓ terms) period as that of X ; that is, the
two periods coincide everywhere but at t ≤ ℓ places. Obviously, a random
sequence of length L coincides with a sequence that has a period of length
L approximately at L2 places. That is, the ℓ-error linear complexity makes
sense only for ℓ < L2 . The following proposition holds.
11i.e., degree of the minimal polynomial over Z/2Z of given sequence
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Proposition 8.9. Let Z be a sequence of Theorem 7.3, and let m = 2s > 1.
Then for ℓ less than the half of the length of the shortest period of the j-
th coordinate sequence δj(Z), the ℓ-error linear complexity of δj(Z) exceeds
2j+m−1, the half of the length of its shortest period.
Proof. In view of Note 8.7 it suffices to prove the statement for the coordi-
nate sequences of a T -function only. According to Proposition 8.5, the j-th
coordinate sequence Y = {xi : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} = δj(Z) of a T -function is a
periodic sequence with the length of the shortest period 2j+1, which satisfies
the relation
δj(xi+2j ) ≡ δj(xi) + 1 (mod 2), (8.9.1)
for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . Since 2j+1 is the length of a period of a (binary) sequence
Y,
w(X) = X2
j+1
+ 1 = (X + 1)2
j+1
is a characteristic polynomial (over a field Z/2Z of two elements) of the
sequence Y.
Let Q = {qi : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} be a binary sequence produced by a LFSR
with d cells such that Q has a period of length 2j+1, and xi = qi for all
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2j+1 − 1} with the exception of ℓ indexes j = j1, . . . , jℓ ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2j+1 − 1}. Since 2j+1 is the length of a period of Q, the minimal
polynomial µ(X) of the sequence Q (which is of degree d then) must be a
multiple of the polynomial X2
j+1
+ 1 = (X + 1)2
j+1
over the field Z/2Z.
Hence, µ(X) = (X + 1)d, and d ≤ 2j+1.
On the other hand, if ℓ < 2j , then in view of (8.9.1) the length of the
shortest period of the sequenceQ cannot be less than 2j+1. Hence, d ≥ 2j+1,
since otherwise µ(x) is a multiple of (X+1)2
j
= X2
j
+1; yet the latter would
imply that Q has a period of length 2j .

We can consider linear complexity of a sequence with terms from an ar-
bitrary commutative ring, not necessarily from the field of two elements.
Definition 8.10. Let Z = {zi} be a sequence over a commutative ring
R. The linear complexity λR(Z) of Z over R is the smallest r ∈ N0 such
that there exist c, c0, c1, . . . , cr−1 ∈ R (not all equal to 0) such that for all
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . holds
c+
r−1∑
j=0
cj · zi+j = 0. (8.10.1)
For instance, if R = Z/pnZ; then geometrically equation (8.10.1) means
that all the points ( zipn ,
zi+1
pn , . . . ,
zi+r−1
pn ), i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., of a unit r-dimensional
Euclidean hypercube fall into parallel hyperplanes. For instance, with the
use of linear complexity over the residue ring Z/2kZ we can study distribu-
tion of r-tuples of the sequence produced by an ergodic T -function modulo
2k. We already know that this sequence, being considered as the sequence of
elements over Z/2kZ is strictly uniformly distributed: Every element from
Z/2kZ occurs at the period exactly once. But what about distribution of
consecutive pairs of elements? Triples? etc. It varies...
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Figure
4. Klimov-
Shamir generator
with C = 101
Figure
5. Same,
with C =
10010000101010111
For example, despite every transitive linear congruential generator xi+1 =
a + b · xi (mod 2k) produces a strictly uniformly distributed sequence over
Z/2kZ, linear complexity over Z/2kZ of this generator is only 2; hence,
distribution of pairs in produced sequences is rather poor: All the points
that correspond to pairs of consecutive numbers fall into a small number of
parallel straight lines in a unit square, and this picture does not depend on
k, see Figure 6.
Another example: The already mentioned T -function x+x2∨C of Klimov
and Shamir has a single cycle property whenever C ≡ 5 (mod 8), or C ≡ 7
(mod 8), see 6.22. However, distribution of pairs of the sequence produced
by this T -function varies from satisfactory (when there are few 1’s in more
significant bit positions, see Figure 4) to poor (when there are more 1’s in
these positions, see Figure 5).
This is not easy to find a T -function that guarantees good distribution of
pairs. For instance, this problem is not completely solved even for quadratic
generators with a single cycle property, despite a number of works in the
area (see e.g. [11, 9] and a survey [10]).
However, we can prove that with respect to the linear complexity over
residue ring the sequence Xn = {f i(x0) mod pn} over Z/pnZ, generated by
compatible ergodic polynomial f(x) ∈ Q[x] of degree ≥ 2, is ‘asymptotically
good’ (cf. Figure 7 for distribution of pairs for a polynomial generator of
degree 8). Namely, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 8.11 ([5]). limn→∞ λZ/pnZ(Xn) = ∞. Moreover, λZ/pnZ(Xn)
tends to ∞ not slower than log n.
We note, however, that in most real life ciphers the use of polynomials
of higher degrees (say, of degrees higher than 2) is too time-costly; so the
search for good functions continues!
8.4. The 2-adic span. There are two other measures of complexity of a
binary sequence, which were introduced in [14]: namely, 2-adic complexity
and 2-adic span. Whereas linear complexity (which is also known as a linear
span) is the number of cells in a linear feedback shift register outputting a
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Figure
6. Lin-
ear congruential
generator 3 + 5x
Figure
7. Polyno-
mial generator of
degree 8
sequence S over Z/2, the 2-adic span is the number of cells in both memory
and register of a feedback with carry shift register (FCSR) that outputs S,
and the 2-adic complexity estimates the number of cells in the register of
this FCSR. To be more exact, the 2-adic complexity Φ2(S) of the (eventu-
ally) periodic sequence S = {s0, s1, s2, . . .} over Z/2 is log2(Φ(u, v)), where
Φ(u, v) = max{|u|, |v|} and uv ∈ Q is the irreducible fraction such that its
2-adic expansion agrees with S, that is, uv = s0+ s12+ s222+ · · · ∈ Z2. The
number of cells in the register of FCSR producing S is then ⌈log2(Φ(u, v))⌉,
the least rational integer not smaller than log2(Φ(u, v)). Thus, we only need
to estimate Φ2(S).
Theorem 8.12 ([6]). Let Sj = {s0, s1, s2, . . . } be the jth coordinate sequence
of an ergodic T -function. Then the 2-adic complexity Φ2(Sj) of Sj is
log2
(
22
j
+ 1
gcd(22j + 1, γ + 1)
)
,
where γ = s0 + s12 + s22
2 + · · ·+ s2j−122j−1.
Note. We note that γ is a non-negative rational integer, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 22j − 1;
also we note that for each γ of this range there exists an ergodic mapping
such that the first half of the period of the jth coordinate sequence of the
corresponding output is a base-2 expansion of γ (see Theorem 8.6). Thus, to
find all possible values of 2-adic complexity of the jth coordinate sequence
one has to decompose the jth Fermat number 22
j
+ 1. It is known that
the jth Fermat number is prime for 0 ≤ j ≤ 4 and that it is composite for
5 ≤ j ≤ 23. For each Fermat number outside this range it is not known
whether it is prime or composite. The complete decomposition of jth Fermat
number is not known for j > 11. Assuming for some j ≥ 2 the jth Fermat
number is composite, all its factors are of the form t2j+2+1, see e.g. [8] for
further references. So, the following bounds for 2-adic complexity Φ2(Sj) of
the jth coordinate sequence Sj hold:
j + 3 ≤ ⌈Φ2(Sj)⌉ ≤ 2j + 1,
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yet to prove whether the lower bound is sharp for a certain j > 11, or whether
⌈Φ2(Sj)⌉ could be actually less than 2j + 1 for j > 23 is as difficult as to
decompose the jth Fermat number or, respectively, to determine whether the
jth Fermat number is prime or composite.
Proof of theorem 8.12. We only have to express s0 + s12 + s22
2 + . . . as
an irreducible fraction. Denote γ = s0 + s12 + s22
2 + · · · + s2j−122j−1.
Then using the second identity of (4.0.2) we in view of 8.5 obtain that
s0+ s12 + s22
2 + · · ·+ s2j+1−122j+1−1 = γ +22j (22j − γ − 1) = γ′ and hence
s0 + s12 + s22
2 + · · · = γ′ + γ′22j+1 + γ′22·2j+1 + γ′23·2j+1 + · · · = γ+1
22
j
+1
− 1.
This completes the proof in view of the definition of 2-adic complexity of a
sequence. 
Note. Similar estimates of Φ2(δn−1(S)) could be obtained for coordinate
sequences of wreath products. In view of 8.5 the argument of the proof of
8.12 gives that the representation of the binary sequence δn−1(S) as a 2-adic
integer is γ+1
22n−1m+1
− 1, so we have only to study a fraction γ+1
22n−1m+1
, where
γ = s0 + s12 + s22
2 + · · · + s2n−1m−122n−1m−1, and m is of statements of
7.4, and of 7.3. Representing m = 2km1 with m1 > 1 odd, we can factorize
22
n−1m+1 = (22
n−1+k
+1)(22
n−1+k(m1−1)−22n−1+k(m1−2)+ · · ·−22n−1+k +1),
but the problem does not become much easier because of the first multiplier.
We omit further details.
9. Schemes
In this section we are going to give some ideas how stream ciphers could
be designed on the basis of the theory discussed above. We must now com-
bine state update and output functions into an automaton that produces a
sequence that might be cryptographically secure.
9.1. Improving lower order bits. The drawback of the sequence pro-
duced by a T -function f : Z/2nZ→ Z/2nZ with the single cycle property is
that the less significant is the bit, the shorter is the period of the sequence
it outputs (see 8.5); that is: Despite the length of the period of the sequence
S = {u0 = u, u1 = f(u0), u2 = f(u1), . . .}
of n-bit words is 2n, the length of the period of the jth bit sequence (i.e.,
the jth coordinate sequence)
Sj = {δj(u0), δj(u1), δj(u2), . . . , δj(ui+1), . . .}
is only 2j+1, (j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1).
From 8.8 it follows also that the less is j, the smaller is linear complexity
of the coordinate sequence. Obviously, in applications we must get rid of
this effect.
Thus, designing a PRNG (see Fig. 1) we must understand what output
function F one should use: F must add security, F must be balanced (for
not to spoil the uniform distribution), and F must cure the very unpleasant
low order bits effect of T -functions.
One way (that of Corollary 8.4) is to truncate low order bits. But this
obviously will reduce the performance of the generator ... Are there other
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π
xi
fi
Hi
xi+1 = fi(xi)
π permutes bits so that
δ0(π(xi)) = δn−1(xi);
i.e., π sends the most
significant bit of xi
to the least significant
bit position!
state update
yi = Hi(π(xi))output
Figure 8. PRNG with a bit order reverse permutation
ways? Since the low order bits effect is an inherent property of T -functions,
one should include in output function some basic chip operations other than
T -functions. Thus, output function will not be a T -function any more.
Could one construct the output function this way, yet not ‘spoil’ good prop-
erties of the sequence of states?
A solution is given at Figure 8: We include into a composition only one
mapping π which permute bit order of the state (which is an n-bit word),
sending the most significant bit (that is, (n − 1)-th bit) to the least sig-
nificant bit position. An important example of such a permutation π is a
word rotation, χn−1χn−2 · · ·χ1χ0 7→ χn−2χn−3 · · ·χ1χ0χn−1, which is also a
standard instruction in most processors.
The following could be proved regarding the output sequence of the so
constructed counter-dependent generator:
Proposition 9.1 ([6]). Let Hi : Z2 → Z2 (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1) be compat-
ible and ergodic mappings. For x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} let
Fi(x) = (Hi(π(x))) mod 2
n,
where π is a permutation of bits of x ∈ Z/2n such that δ0(π(x)) = δn−1(x).
Consider a sequence F of 7.6. Then the shortest period of the jth coordinate
sequence Fj = δj(F) (j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1) is of length 2nkj for a suitable
1 ≤ kj ≤ m. Moreover, linear complexity of the sequence Fj exceeds 2n−1.
9.2. The ABC stream cipher. With the use of the above considerations
a fast software-oriented stream cipher ABC is being developed now, see [2].
In this subsection we outline underlying ideas of the design to demonstrate
their relations with the theory developed above. To make these ideas more
transparent, we consider the ABC ‘template’ (see Figure 9.2) rather than
the actual design; the later has some differences from the template due to
necessity to withstand certain attacks. However, we do not discuss these
differences here since our aim is to illustrate the 2-adic techniques in stream
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xi
hL
+
+
+
S
xi+1 = ci,r + h(xi)
h(x) = ((((x + a0) ⊕ b0) + a1) ⊕ b1) + a2
h(xi)ci+1 = L(ci) ci
ci = (ci,ℓ; ci,r)
ci,ℓ
ci,r
S(x) = d+
Pn−1
j=0 dj · δn−j−1(x)
plain text stream encrypted text stream
Figure 9. The ABC stream cipher template. Here L is a
linear transformation, ⊞ and + stand for integer addition,
and ⊕ stands for XOR.
cipher design rather than to give a comprehensive cryptographical analysis
of a particular algorithm.
The main goal of the design was to achieve high performance and to prove
some important properties of the key stream, e.g. long period and uniform
distribution.
The high performance is achieved by a very restricted set of instructions
that are used: Actually, only fastest instructions, such as +, XOR and shifts
are allowed. That’s why the clock state update function fi (c.f. Figure 8) is
of the form hi(x) = ci,r + ((((x + a0)⊕ b0) + a1)⊕ b1) + a2.
Now recall Example 6.24 and Example 3 of 7.7. Note that L is a linear
transformation that is produced by a linear feedback shift register of a max-
imum period length; ci,r is a right-hand part of the outputted word, so the
sequence {ci,r : i = 0, 1, 2, . . .} is a LFSR sequence with a maximum period
length. Thus, the state sequence {xi} has a maximum period length, and is
strictly uniformly distributed.
After producing a uniformly distributed sequence of states, we need to
improve period lengths of output sequence. In ABC we do it with the use
of Proposition 9.1, that is, by a circuit described by Figure 8.
Actually, in ABC we take π to be a bit order reverse permutation,
δj(π(x)) = δn−j−1(x),
for all x ∈ Z/2nZ. However, this permutation is rather slow in software
since one has to work with bits rather than with words. Yet we use a trick
to avoid this undesirable reduce of performance. The trick is based on the
use of special output function S(x) = d +
∑n−1
j=0 dj · δn−j−1(x), which is
a composition of two functions, of a permutation π, and of the function
F (x) = d+ d0 · δ0(x) + d1 · δ1(x) + · · · . Thus, to apply Proposition 9.1, we
must know when F is ergodic.
The following Proposition could be proved:
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Proposition 9.2 ([4]). The function F (x) = d+ d0 · δ0(x) + d1 · δ1(x) + · · ·
is compatible and ergodic if and only if ‖d‖2 = 1, d0 ≡ 1 (mod 4), and
‖dj‖2 = 2−j for j = 1, 2, . . .
Now we just take clock output functions Hi (c.f. Figure 8) of the form
Hi(x) = ci,ℓ + F (x), where ci,ℓ is the left-hand part of the word produced
by LSFR L. Thus, the circuit at Figure 9.2 is a special case of the circuit at
Figure 8. We note, once again, that compare to the template, the real-life
stream cipher ABC has some important differences, yet however use of the
above mentioned ideas enable us to prove crucial cryptographic properties
of the cipher, long period, uniform distribution and high linear complexity
of output sequence, see [2] for details.
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